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Glossary
AFS – “Alternative Financial Services” establishments that offer financial services – typically to low-income 
consumers – without the use of a formal, FDIC-insured bank account. These establishments include check 
cashers, pawn shops, jewelry resale establishments, money transfer and remittance vendors, and payday loan 
shops.
APR – Annual percentage rate is a measure of annualized interest charged on a credit card or loan.
Citywide Financial Services Study (CFSS) – A study undertaken between 2009 and 2011 by the New 
York City Department of Consumer Affairs to document the extent and distribution of the City’s unbanked and 
underbanked population. 
Closed-loop prepaid debit card – Also known as a “stored value card” or “gift card,” this type of card must 
be pre-loaded with cash value, either online through a checking account or at a retail location with cash or 
debit card payment. As a closed-loop card, this payment technology is limited to a single brand or product line, 
typically a retail brand such as Starbucks or McDonald’s.
Closed-loop smartcard – A transit agency-issued, closed-loop prepaid that uses the contactless, ISO 14443 
technology exclusively for fare payment transactions. 
Contactless bank card – A credit or debit card issued by a mainstream financial institution that uses the 
contactless ISO 14443 or similar technology. Contactless bank cards can be used as fare payment devices in a 
transit agency’s open payment system.
Contactless smartcard – Any RFID-based, microprocessor-embedded card device capable of 
communicating with an RFID reader, whether used in transit fare payment, vehicle tolling, retail payment or 
physical access control.  
EBT – Electronic Benefit Transfer is a system of privately-managed prepaid debit cards used to facilitate the 
electronic transfer of government benefits in the United States such as Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) 
or Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (formerly known as “Food Stamps”).
GPR prepaid card – Unlike EBT or stored value cards, GPR or “general-purpose reloadable” prepaid debit 
cards are unrestricted and can be used for all retail transactions, not just benefits or transactions within a 
particular brand. 
MTA – Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the New York State government authority responsible for 
operating most public transit (subways, commuter rail, bus, bus rapid transit) and major bridges and tunnels in 
the New York metropolitan area.
Mobile payment -  A payment technology using near-field communications (NFC) to transmit payment 
wirelessly from a consumer’s online bank account to a merchant via a contactless RFID processor. In a 
contactless smartcard fare payment system, the mobile phone replaces the smartcard as the payment device. 
Near-field communications (NFC) – A technology that allows mobile phones to communicate wirelessly 
with a payment device or receiver. NFC is generally compatible with contactless smartcard technology through 
the ISO 14443 standard. 
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Open-loop smartcard – See “open payment.”
Open payment – A transit fare payment system in which any contactless device – a transit-issued contactless 
smartcard, a GPR prepaid card, a contactless bank card, or mobile payment – may be used to pay for transit 
fares. 
Prepaid debit card – A reloadable debit card that is not linked to a formal bank account. Whether the 
prepaid debit card is closed-loop (“stored value”) or open-loop (“GPR”), it must be pre-loaded with cash value 
before being used to transact. 
Stored value card – see “closed-loop prepaid debit card”
Title VI – A section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requiring all transit agencies receiving federal support to 
equitably accommodate all passengers regardless of race, ethnicity, age, disability, gender or other protected 
classes. 
Unbanked – An individual who has no relationship with any mainstream financial institution or formal bank 
account. 
Underbanked – A person who has access to a formal bank account but may, for a variety of reasons, be 
compelled to rely on alternative financial services (AFS) for most transactions. 
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The unbanked – individuals who lack a bank account with a mainstream financial institution – are one 
of the more broadly disadvantaged groups in American society. There is a great deal of demographic 
overlap between the unbanked as a cohort and other marginalized groups, notably undocumented 
immigrants, low-income Blacks and Latinos and non-native English speakers. These groups are an 
important constituency for transportation agencies in that they are more likely to travel by transit than 
other Americans. As many transit agencies transition their fare payment systems to radio frequency 
identification (RFID)-based, “contactless” smartcard or open payment technology linked to a rider’s 
bank account, there are growing opportunities to enhance multi-modalism in passenger trips, reduce 
operations costs, increase system profitability, and expand access to fare payment media. However, 
due to equity requirements of the Civil Rights Act, transit agencies must ensure that the smartcard 
technology also accommodates the unbanked. Ensuring that transit fare payment systems adequately 
serve the unbanked requires an assessment of New York’s unbanked population beyond that which 
is available in current academic literature. A 2011 study from the NYC Department of Consumer 
Affairs identified several New York City neighborhoods with the highest proportions of unbanked and 
underbanked residents. Through intercept surveys in two of these majority-unbanked neighborhoods 
– Fordham (Bronx) and Bushwick (Brooklyn) – this study attempts to clarify the travel behavior and fare 
payment characteristics of the un(der)banked. In addition, this study investigates potential fare policy 
alternatives in an open payment system that would adequately accommodate the transportation 
needs of the unbanked. To articulate policy recommendations to meet this objective, this study 
includes structured interviews with transit fare policy experts in the public, private and nonprofit 
sectors. These interviews explored how transit agencies can select the most appropriate fare payment 
technology; effectively partner with retailers and alternative financial services (AFS) to make its new 
fare payment medium accessible to un(der)banked communities; and establish performance metrics to 
monitor the fare payment system’s long-term equity. 
Abstract
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Individuals who do not participate in mainstream 
banking institutions – known as  “unbanked” 
if they lack bank accounts altogether and 
“underbanked” if they have inactive, low-
balance bank accounts but still rely on 
alternative financial services like check cashers or 
payday loans – are one of the more marginalized 
cohorts of American society. Unbanked status is 
often correlated with an array of disadvantaged 
social conditions. The unbanked are generally 
more likely to be low-income, lack personal 
financial savings, be undocumented immigrants, 
or be members of an ethnic minority group. For 
transit agencies, the unbanked are an important 
constituency given that they are significantly 
more transit-dependent than other Americans. 
As many transit agencies transition their fare 
payment systems to RFID-based, “contactless” 
smartcard technology, there are growing 
opportunities to enhance multi-modalism1 in 
1 Refers to travel behavior that incorporates multiple modes of 
travel within the same trip.
Introduction
passenger trips; reduce system operations 
costs; and expand access to fare payment 
technology to locations beyond transit-owned 
facilities. However, for reasons of social equity 
transit agencies must ensure that new smartcard 
fare payment systems also accommodate the 
unique transportation needs of the unbanked. 
Ensuring that transit fare payment systems 
adequately serve the unbanked requires a 
thorough understanding of the demographics of 
the unbanked in New York City and the United 
States more broadly.   
Image Source: Gloria Shur Bilchik, Occasional Planet
Un(der)banked customers line up outside an AFS establishment in St. Louis, Missouri.




Accommodating the unbanked in transportation 
policy is an under-explored area of research that 
has taken on new importance as many transit 
agencies adopt smartcard-based fare payment 
technologies that are linked to a rider’s bank 
account. While earlier research has explored 
the inequities of transportation policy with 
respect to low-income transit riders, a transit 
rider’s access to mainstream financial services 
has become a growing determinant of inequity. 
One’s access to transit service and ability to 
pay for transit fares are increasingly becoming 
functions of one’s degree of participation 
in mainstream financial institutions. The 
intersection of transit fare policy and access 
to financial services for low-income riders is 
therefore a matter that warrants discussion from 
a framework of environmental justice. 
Environmental justice theory holds that 
communities of color are disproportionately harmed 
by negative impacts of the planning process while 
also receiving fewer of its benefits (Sanchez and 
Brenman, 2007, 4). Environmental justice theorists 
typically frame their arguments in terms of the unique 
disadvantages that communities of color face in 
the built environment, such as the disproportionate 
public health impacts of local air pollution from 
bus depots in low-income neighborhoods (ibid, 7). 
Dating back at least to the Rosa Parks case of 1955, 
equal access to transportation facilities – regardless 
of race, ethnicity, or other protected class – has long 
been considered a civil right. Because the unbanked  
as a cohort share with communities of color many 
aspects of marginality along the lines of race, 
income, language or citizenship, there is a strong 
argument that they would also experience similar 
negative outcomes in terms of access to public 
transportation. 
The unique status of being unbanked – itself 
an artifact of low incomes, citizenship status, and 
rising social inequality, among other factors – is not 
currently protected by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 
Title VI only prohibits recipients of federal funding, 
such as transit agencies, from discriminating on the 
basis of race, color, or national origin (ibid, 10). Since 
the 2001 Supreme Court case Alexander v. Sandoval, 
individuals are no longer able to bring suit against 
transit agencies to enforce Title VI regulations (ibid, 
74). This ruling shifts the burden of enforcing Title 
VI regulations and achieving equitable access to 
transportation for marginalized groups like the 
un(der)banked from individuals onto public interest 
NGO’s. The un(der)banked represent the next 
frontier in the pursuit of environmental justice in the 
United States given that un(der)banked individuals 
are comprised primarily of the low-income, ethnic 
minorities, and recent immigrants as well as other 
traditionally marginalized groups. 
Broadly speaking, being unbanked is correlated 
with low-income status (NYC Department of 
Consumer Affairs, 2013, 14) Black and Latino 
households (Rhine et al, 2006; Brakewood and Kocur, 
2012), low educational attainment (Carney, 2012, 
12; NYC Department of Consumer Affairs, 2013, 
14) and spatially concentrated immigrant enclaves 
(Bohn and Pearlman, 2013; Jacob et al, 2005, 8). 
National estimates of the unbanked population vary 
widely from 7% (Carney, 2012), 8.2% (FDIC, 2012), 
17% (Jacob et al, 2005, 8) to 22% (Stegman, 2004; 
Brakewood and Kocur, 2012; Smart Card Alliance, 
2007). If the underbanked and unbanked are 
included in the estimate, their combined percentage 
may be as high as 30% nationally (FDIC, 2012). In New 
York City, it is estimated that 13% of all households 
and 42% of all low-income households are unbanked 
(New York City Department of Consumer Affairs, 
2012; Stegman, 2004). Unbanked status creates 
significant obstacles to wealth creation, bill 
payment, and general financial stability. According 
to Stegman, 69% of the unbanked had no financial 
savings, compared to just 22% of the banked 
population (2004, 6). Beyond the economic hardships 
of lacking any savings and living ‘paycheck to 
paycheck’, the unbanked are often compelled to pay 
disproportionately high fees at AFS establishments 
(check cashers, pawn shops, payday loan and money 
transfer centers). AFS establishments generally 
charge very high transaction fees and interest rates 
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for cashing checks, bill payment and short-term 
loans, which can total $1,000 a year or $15,000 
over a lifetime (Kumeh, 2012; Stegman, 2004, 6). 
Check cashers and payday lenders in New York 
City, for example, charge 1.98% of the face value of 
a check to cash it, and an annual percentage rate 
(APR) of between 200 and 500% for a 14-day loan 
(Servon, 2014). Unbanked individuals are therefore 
deprived of both more affordable financial services 
at mainstream banks and a wide range of wealth-
building transactions that typically require a bank 
account, such as obtaining a home mortgage loan 
or auto loan, securing a job or apartment requiring a 
good FICO credit score2, or enrolling in payroll direct 
deposit. 
The theme of transportation equity is a key 
pillar of the environmental justice movement and is 
charged with mitigating the substantial disparities 
in access to transportation in society. Transportation 
equity encompasses a wide range of transit policy 
issues, such as fare policy, service frequency and 
coverage, or fair procurement practices in project 
construction. Unbanked status is typically coupled 
with other marginalized identities that research on 
transportation equity has explored in greater detail. 
For the purposes of this investigation, it is therefore 
useful to compare the overlapping challenges of 
unequal access to transportation faced by both 
unbanked and low-income transit rider groups. 
Inequitable access to transit often manifests 
in the disproportionate cost of transportation, 
particularly among low-income transit riders. 
The cost of transportation accounts for a 
disproportionate share of disposable income among 
low-income individuals, regardless of whether 
they choose to drive or take public transit. A 2001 
report showed that those in the lowest-income 
quintile spent 36% of their disposable income on 
transportation, compared to just 14% among the 
highest-income quintile (Sanchez and Brenman, 
2007, 34). Low-income individuals are less likely 
than the general population to drive and more than 
three times more likely to take transit, due to the 
relatively high costs of auto ownership, insurance, 
maintenance, fuel, and taxes (Pucher and Renne, 
2003, 59). A national survey from the American 
Public Transportation Association indicated that a 
2 Environmental justice theorists commonly view the de-
termining factors of the widely used FICO credit score, used 
by landlords and employers alike to screen for applicants, as 
discriminatory against communities of color. As Rice and Swesnik 
note, “some scoring mechanisms assume that a borrower who re-
ceived a loan from a finance company is a greater credit risk than 
one who received a loan from a depository institution. In fact, 
the opposite may be true. A credit-scoring system relying on this 
false premise penalizes the borrower who simply may not have 
had access to a mainstream lender, but had abundant access to 
fringe lenders. Indeed, credit-scoring mechanisms reflect the 
lending and finance systems producing the data upon which the 
mechanisms are built. Oftentimes, credit-scoring mechanisms 
assess the riskiness of the lending environment, product type, or 
loan features a consumer uses rather than his or her risk profile” 
(2013, 949).
substantial portion of transit riders is low-income: 
38% have incomes below $20,000, while 79% of 
transit riders have incomes below $75,000 (Sanchez 
and Brenman, 2007, 41). Because low-income 
Americans are disproportionately dependent on 
transit, changes in fare policy or transit service 
levels have greater impact on poor communities. 
70% of major transit agencies have made, or are 
planning to make, service cuts or raised fares since 
the 2008 recession (American Public Transportation 
Association, 2011, 2). These service cuts and fare 
increases – especially for bus transit – generally have 
inequitable effects as they diminish the access to 
and raise the cost of transportation for low-income 
communities that are less likely to be able to afford 
car or rail travel alternatives. 
 Moreover, in large multimodal transit systems 
there is a great deal of evidence that low-income 
transit riders taking shorter bus trips effectively 
cross-subsidize high-income transit riders taking 
more expensive rail trips. According to the 
National Household Travel Survey (NHTS), low-
income households earning less than $20,000 a 
year comprise 47% of bus riders, 20% of subway 
riders, and just 6% of commuter rail riders (Sanchez 
and Brenman, 2007, 43). Subway, light rail, and 
commuter rail modes each have very high capital 
costs compared to bus transportation, where most 
of the costs are in operations. As a result, many 
transit agencies spend large portions of their 
budgets on expensive capital projects serving 
higher-income riders, often at the expense of bus 
riders (a predominantly low-income, minority group) 
who lack alternative means of travel. In Los Angeles, 
for instance, the LACMTA faced Title VI lawsuits in 
the early 1990’s on precisely these grounds. The 
agency was accused of discriminatory transit service 
provision in light of the fact that bus riders, 94% of all 
system passengers, received just 30% of its funding 
while the other 70% went to rail projects (ibid, 
44). Transportation equity literature also suggests 
that low-income people face longer-than-average 
commute times in most American cities. Data from 
the NHTS indicate that low-income residents in New 
York City faced average commutes of 39 minutes, 
compared to the metropolitan area’s average 
commute time of just 30 minutes (Shen, 2000, 78). 
Likewise, New Yorkers with long commutes are 
disproportionately low-income. According to analysis 
by the Pratt Center for Community Development, 
two-thirds of New Yorkers with commutes greater 
than 60 minutes have incomes less than $35,000, 
while just 6% of these commuters make more than 
$75,000 (Center for an Urban Future, 2011, 4). Among 
New York City Transit riders as a cohort, bus riders 
are known to have a lower median income ($39,600) 
than subway riders ($58,300) or riders who take both 
subways and buses ($46,300) (Seltzer, 2008, 20). 
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There is significant demographic overlap 
between transit riders overall and the unbanked. Like 
transit riders as a cohort, substantial majorities of the 
unbanked population are low-income and members 
of ethnic minority groups. As the MTA pursues new 
fare payment technologies, it is prudent to examine 
New York City’s unbanked population through the 
lens of transportation equity. An analytical framework 
of transportation equity evaluates transit policy 
outcomes in terms of “disparate impact3:”  do un(der)
banked transit riders face differential or inferior 
access to transit services compared to banked transit 
riders? To answer this question, it is necessary to 
understand why individuals may be un(der)banked in 
the first place. 
There are many possible motivations for being 
un(der)banked. The most common reason cited 
for being unbanked is low-income status, which 
manifests in a lack of funds required to open a bank 
account or maintain a minimum balance (Rhine 
et al, 2006, 155; NYC Department of Consumer 
Affairs, 2013, 63). Other major motivations for being 
unbanked are found among immigrant communities. 
Recent immigrants often lack sufficient credit history 
in the United States to qualify for bank accounts 
or credit cards (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2010, 215). 
Consumers may also choose to be unbanked 
because of a cultural history of bank discrimination 
against communities of color (Joassart-Marcelli and 
Stephens, 2010, 885), because of difficulties with 
English language proficiency (Bohn and Pearlman, 
2013, 867; NYC Department of Consumer Affairs, 
2013, 49), inconvenience of bank hours or location 
(Joassart-Marcelli and Stephens, 2010, 886), or 
because they are undocumented and do not wish 
to put themselves at risk of deportation by having 
their identities verified (Jacobs and Jankowski, 2008, 
2). Another common explanation for the choice 
to be unbanked is, in the case of immigrants, the 
inability or unwillingness of mainstream banks to 
facilitate international wire transfers to non-bank 
entities, otherwise known as remittances (Caskey et 
al, 2006, 53). Many unbanked individuals also prefer 
the immediacy and low cost of fund transfers from 
alternative financial services (AFS) compared to 
traditional banks (ibid, 32). 
The dependency of unbanked on AFS illustrates 
the duality between individual agency and societal 
structure ingrained in the condition of being 
unbanked. Most literature suggests that being 
unbanked is a choice that consumers make under 
3 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of 
federal funds from “conducting activities that have a less favor-
able effect or ‘disparate impact’ on members of one racial or 
ethnic group than on another” (Sanchez and Brenman, 2007, 74). 
However, the Alexander v. Sandoval case set a new precedent for 
enforcing this legislation. Title VI lawsuits may only be consid-
ered if the plaintiffs can prove that an action was taken intention-
ally to discriminate; the weight of statistical evidence showing 
disparate impact is no longer sufficient.
severe financial stress and only when more traditional 
options have been exhausted. Stoesz argues that the 
steady growth of the AFS sector is a direct result of 
growing economic inequality in the U.S. In particular, 
the AFS sector is designed for the “secondary labor 
market” characterized by low-wage, often part-time, 
service-sector jobs that offer few, if any, benefits, and 
little upward mobility (Stoesz, 2014, 4).  Workers in 
the secondary labor market, caught between dual 
pressures of low, stagnant wages and a rising cost 
of living, are often forced to make unwise financial 
decisions such as maxing out credit cards and 
incurring overdrafts. 
There is some evidence that individuals may 
transfer back and forth between formal banks 
and AFS – between banked, underbanked, and 
unbanked statuses – according to their relative 
financial situation. According to a Pew study, 59% 
of AFS customers had previously maxed out a 
mainstream credit card, while 52% had overdrawn a 
mainstream checking account in the past year (qtd. 
in Stoez, 2014, 7). In addition, a negative banking 
history can persistently exclude people from the 
financial mainstream. According to an FDIC survey 
of unbanked households that previously had bank 
accounts, 10% said the main reason they no longer 
had an account was because the bank had closed 
it, while another 6% said they were denied bank 
accounts because of problems with identification, 
credit or banking history (Valenti and Heiss, 2013, 
5). The New York Times estimated that more than 
one million low-income Americans are unbanked 
because of banks’ anti-fraud database systems that 
automatically flag individuals who are declined 
for these reasons (Silver-Greenberg and Corkery, 
2014). This suggests that un(der)banked status is not 
necessarily a voluntary, rational choice but rather 
a financial fail-safe that low-income consumers are 
compelled to make by the convergence of economic 
stagnation in the unskilled labor market and 
increasingly punitive regulations in the mainstream 
financial institutions.  
Minimum balance requirements, monthly 
maintenance fees, and high overdraft fees of are 
some of the most significant impediments that low-
income consumers face in navigating mainstream 
banks. One troubling trend in mainstream finance is 
the rapid disappearance of free checking accounts. 
According to the Center for American Progress, 
the percentage of mainstream financial institutions 
offering free checking accounts declined from 75% 
in 2009 to just 39% in 2012 (Valenti and Heiss, 2013, 
3). Meanwhile, the average monthly maintenance fee 
doubled to $5.48 during the same period. Likewise, 
the average minimum balance required to avoid 
the maintenance fee rose to $723 in 2012, up 23% 
from 2011 (ibid). Servon argues that a standard bank 
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overdraft fee4  – if seen as a short-term, seven-day 
loan – would have an APR of over 5,000 percent 
(2013, 3). It is therefore not surprising that un(der)
banked consumers “often find traditional banks 
to be more expensive, more confusing, and less 
service-oriented than AFS” (Servon, 2014, 2). As the 
financial systems serving low-income Americans 
become increasingly precarious and informal, transit 
agencies must understand the unique travel behavior 
characteristics of their un(der)banked riders and 
reconcile the potential benefits of smartcard fare 
payment technology with the risks of inequitable 
outcomes for this highly transit-dependent group. 
There has been relatively little research 
performed on the travel behavior or transportation 
needs of the un(der)banked as a cohort. A much 
more established literature is available on the travel 
behavior of immigrants in the U.S., who may serve 
as a kind of proxy for the un(der)banked. Nearly 
one-third of foreign-born individuals are unbanked, 
and the gap between foreign-born and native-born 
individuals in unbanked status is growing - from 8% in 
1990 to 14% in 2001 (Bohn and Pearlman, 2013, 865; 
Stegman, 2004; Jacob et al, 2005, 8). The likelihood 
of being unbanked also increases in spatially 
concentrated immigrant enclaves, which points 
to the interaction between cultural and economic 
factors that contribute to being un(der)banked. 
Bohn and Pearlman found that if the concentration 
of immigrants from a household’s region of origin 
increases by 10%, the probability that the average 
immigrant household has a bank account relative to 
similar natives falls by 2.4% (2013, 883). 
Research on immigrant travel behavior reveals 
that, like low-income groups, immigrant cohorts 
are more likely than native-born control groups 
to walk, cycle, or take public transit (Chatman and 
Klein, 2009, 336; Smart, 2010, 152). The barriers that 
immigrants face to auto ownership are very similar 
to the barriers the unbanked face to participation 
in mainstream financial institutions. Compared to 
native-born individuals, Smart found that immigrants 
face a variety of restrictions to auto ownership 
in the form of credit checks, lack of mainstream 
credit history, ethnic and racial discrimination, low 
household wealth, and undocumented status (2010, 
154).  Undocumented status, and in particular the 
fear of being stopped by police, is likely a major 
determining factor for taking transit given that 
an estimated 16% of foreign-born individuals are 
undocumented (ibid, 154). Together these factors 
may compel the undocumented to pursue other 
travel modes such as transit, cycling, or carpooling. 
In particular, first-generation immigrants are much 
more likely to use buses and carpools than native-
4 The median overdraft fee among mainstream banks was 
about $35 in 2011 (Valenti and Heiss, 2013, 6).
born individuals, though this gap tends to narrow 
as tenure in the U.S. increases (Chatman and Klein, 
2009, 341). 
In one of the few studies focusing on the travel 
behavior of the unbanked, Brakewood and Kocur 
found that 20% of sampled transit riders in Chicago 
were unbanked and 25% used AFS and can therefore 
be considered underbanked (2012, 7). Therefore, 
between 20 and 45 percent of Chicago’s transit 
riders may be considered un(der)banked. Like 
transit riders as a whole, the unbanked “tend to have 
lower incomes, be unemployed, be bus users, and 
be minorities” (Brakewood and Kocur, 2012, 15). 
Because bus riders tend to have lower incomes than 
other transit riders and unbanked status is partly 
an artifact of low household income, it is thus likely 
that unbanked people are more likely to be bus 
riders than users of other modes of transit. Likewise, 
a 2003 rider demographic study by the Bay Area 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) 
estimated that more than 60% of Bay Area residents 
who ride public transit and live in households with 
annual incomes below $15,000 do not have a bank 
account. For transit riders in households earning 
between $15,000 and $30,000, the estimated 
percentage without a bank account was 40% 
(SmartCard Alliance Transportation Council, 2008, 8). 
The implication for fare payment systems is clear: for 
such systems to effectively serve low-income transit 





Many transit agencies are beginning to adopt, 
or have adopted, new fare payment systems 
that utilize “smartcards” linked to a rider’s bank 
account. Smartcard technology has greatly 
matured since the 1980s, and today smartcards 
are used in government benefits distribution, 
retail purchases, vehicle tolling, as well as transit 
fare payment. Smartcard fare payment systems 
are typically transit-issued microprocessor-
embedded devices that communicate with 
RFID-based readers without physical contact; 
they are therefore “contactless.” Many banks 
and credit card companies have also introduced 
contactless credit and debit cards. Transit 
agency technologies that also accept payments 
from third party contactless bank cards are 
known as “open payment” or “open-loop” 
(Perrotta, 2013 4). Meanwhile, if a smartcard 
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is limited to transit transactions only, it is 
considered “closed-loop.” Increasingly, open-
loop fare payment systems are also being 
integrated with mobile applications to allow 
passengers to pay fares and reload balances 
with mobile phone applications using near field 
communications (NFC) technology. In the case 
of NFC, the mobile phone itself replaces the 
contactless smartcard as the payment device. 
According to McDonald, the boom in smartcard 
adoption stems from the combination of four 
factors: 1) the desire of banks and credit card 
companies to leverage interchange fees on 
low-cost transactions; 2) the need for better 
identification cards for government programs; 
3) the increasing sophistication of mobile 
payment technology in smartphones; and 
4) transit agencies’ need for alternative fare 
payment media with the obsolescence and rising 
maintenance costs of legacy fare collection 
systems (McDonald, 2000, 3).
One of the most significant potential benefits 
of smartcard fare payment systems is an improved 
transit level of service and superior customer service 
compared to magnetic stripe cards. Smartcards 
allow increased passenger throughput at stations, 
also known as “speed of ingress,” and faster average 
boarding times on buses. Tokyo’s Suica smartcard 
boasts an average passenger throughput of 60 
passengers per minute per turnstile at subway 
stations (Quibria, 2008,12), while Montreal’s OPUS 
card achieved a passenger throughput of 45 
passengers per minute on buses (Pelletier et al, 
2011, 562). Lower boarding times equate to reduced 
bus dwell times, which is important given the slow 
bus travel speeds in many North American cities. 
New York City, in particular, is known to have North 
America’s slowest bus speeds, at an average of just 
8.1 miles per hour (TCRP, 2014, 41). Time savings 
for passengers, who no longer have to fumble for 
cards that must be swiped just so, lead to a more 
seamless, comfortable transit experience. According 
to the smartcard implementation manager for 
Philadelphia’s SEPTA, Jerry Kane, smartcards are 
being introduced in response to growing customer 
demands and are “part of providing a top-notch 
transit experience” (qtd in Keitel, 2009). Distributing 
smartcards effectively relieves transit agencies of 
the obligation to produce their own transit currency. 
According to Kane, “SEPTA is in the business of 
providing quality transportation to its riders, not 
printing money” (qtd in Keitel, 2009, 12). An open-
loop smartcard, in particular, allows transit agencies 
to gradually outsource the management of its fare 
payment systems to other parties and perhaps 
even cease issuing fare cards altogether (Keitel, 
2012, 10). Smartcards are also significantly more 
durable than magnetic stripe fare cards; since the 
payment is contactless, there is less physical wear 
and tear on the card. Under normal conditions, 
smartcards can last up to 10 years or more before 
the microprocessors begin to fail (Pelletier et al, 2011, 
560). Finally, smartcards can help to reduce customer 
complaints. Unlike magnetic stripe cards, lost or 
stolen smartcards can be deactivated electronically. 
In the case of WMATA’s SmarTrip, a lost or stolen 
smartcard can be registered online or at a sales 
office and then have the full value replace on a new 
card (Quibria, 2008, 11). 
Smartcards also allow transit agencies to increase 
their revenues, encourage multi-modalism, and 
achieve a more flexible and equitable fare structure. 
Smartcards allow transit agencies more flexibility to 
develop more complex fare structures depending 
on time of day, mode, route, number of transfers, 
and finer gradations of distance (Perrotta, 2014, 3; 
Pelletier et al, 2011, 559). Smartcards also enable 
agencies to create an inter-operable fare payment 
system across different modes or transit agencies, 
thereby encouraging seamless multi-modal 
transfers and increasing farebox revenues through 
linked trips (Perrotta, 2014, 3). Differentiated fare 
structures under smartcards still allow for equity fare 
discounts, such as for seniors, low-income riders, 
students and the disabled. For instance, equity 
discounts in Washington, DC, are subsidized by the 
municipality, which sells discounted fares in poorer 
neighborhoods and then reimburses WMATA for 
the difference (ibid, 5). Because smartcards are 
personalized and linked to a bank account, they 
theoretically allow transit agencies to set a “best 
fare” policy in which people pay fares based on 
their ability to pay (ibid). This would enable transit 
agencies to charge higher fares for peak trips 
on more congested corridors while maintaining 
discount fares for vulnerable groups such as low-
income riders, leading to greater farebox recovery 
without compromising transportation equity. 
Another benefit of smartcards is that by 
collecting information on rider origins and 
destinations electronically, in real-time, they provide 
transit agencies with much more advanced datasets 
on rider travel behavior. Data from smartcards allows 
agencies to analyze travel behavior down to the scale 
of individual passengers, which was impossible with 
magnetic stripe technology (Pelletier et al, 2011, 
560). This data can then help agencies better tailor 
their service planning by pinpointing the system’s 
maximum and minimum load points, passenger 
variability on specific routes, likelihood of transfers, 
and precise boarding and alighting points (ibid, 564). 
Smartcards can yield significant operations cost 
savings as well. The cost of fare collection for most 
transit agencies is substantial, ranging from 7-12% 
for heavy rail and commuter rail to 4-6% for bus and 
light rail (McDonald, 2000, 18). Pelletier et al also 
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found that most transit agencies spend between 5 
and 15% of their annual revenues on fare collection 
(2011, 560). Although smartcards have generally high 
capital costs of implementation, most studies have 
shown that these are more than offset by lower life 
cycle costs in operation and lower long-term agency 
costs of fare collection (Perotta, 2014, 4; Pelletier et al 
2011, 561). In Singapore’s EZ-Link smartcard system, 
for example, the cost of fare collection declined 6% 
post-implementation. Hong Kong’s Octopus Card, 
meanwhile, has half the annual operations cost of the 
previous magnetic stripe system (Perotta 2014, 3). 
These savings are primarily based on the smartcards’ 
durability, lower equipment maintenance costs, 
and the reduction of labor-intensive cash handling 
processes. 
Moreover, smartcards help agencies lessen 
the toll of fare evasion and fraud, which in many 
agencies may constitute revenue losses of up to 10% 
annually (Perrotta, 2014, 5). One ancillary benefit 
of smartcards is that they enable transit agencies 
to reduce staff needed to maintain ticket vending 
machines. WMATA reported a 15% staff reduction 
in such staff after implementation of SmarTrip 
(Quibria, 2008, 14). However, the most urgent and 
compelling reason agencies are often interested in 
switching from magnetic stripe to smartcard is that 
the magnetic stripe technology’s supply chain is 
collapsing. SEPTA director Kane described needing 
to phase out magnetic stripe machines because the 
list of eligible vendors to manufacture replacement 
parts for these machines had effectively disappeared 
(Keitel, 2009, 10).
Transit agencies are not the only stakeholder that 
sees opportunity in smartcards; there is tremendous 
interest from the private sector as well. One reason 
there is pressure on transit agencies to implement 
open payment smartcards (not just closed-loop 
systems) is that banks and credit card companies 
need a high volume of transactions for the low-cost 
transaction market to be profitable (McDonald, 
2000, 8). Transportation provides that needed 
volume through a “captive clientele” that must use 
the dedicated transit fare payment method in order 
to board (Quibria, 2008, 15). Transit can therefore 
be seen as a vector for the adoption of smartcards 
and contactless payment in low-cost transactions 
throughout the broader retail economy. Keitel 
argues that riders using open loop contactless cards 
are more likely to use their contactless cards for 
transactions outside of the transit system, and that 
the brand goodwill of the issuing transit agency itself 
may be transferred to other merchants (2009, 12). In 
this vein, Montreal-based research from Paez et al 
suggests that certain types of commercial businesses 
tend to cluster near subway stations more than others 
(notably restaurants, grocery stores, and beauty 
shops). Because of their spatial affinity with transit 
stations, Paez argues that these types of businesses 
may be ideal commercial partners in a smartcard 
rewards or loyalty program that is mutually beneficial 
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Selection of transit fare payment smartcards from around the world.
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Table 1: Transit Agency Smart Card Implementation
City Transit 
Agency
Card Name Primary Fare 
Technology










Oyster Card itself is closed-
loop but TfL began accepting 
contactless bank cards in 2013; all 
buses are now cashless
Hong Kong MTR Octopus Card Open payment/NFC Distance-based
Singapore LTA EZ-Link Open payment/NFC Distance-based Plans to reduce redundancies 
among multiple operator using 
cloud computing
Tokyo JR East Suica Open payment/NFC Distance, time, and 
mode-based
Seattle King County 
Metro
Orca Card Smartcard Zone-based, peak/off-
peak pricing
Considering open payment/NFC
San Francisco BART, SF Muni, 
others
Clipper Card (formerly 
TransLink)
Smartcard Distance-based Considering open payment/NFC
Washington, D.C WMATA SmarTrip Smartcard Distance-based Implementing Open payment/
NFC
Chicago CTA Ventra (formerly 
Chicago Card)
Open payment/NFC Distance-based Launched in summer 2014, the 
first large U.S. transit agency to 
offer open payment
Boston MBTA Charlie Card Smartcard Flat fare Implemented “mTicket,” mobile 
payment on commuter rail in 
2012
New York City MTA Metro Card Magnetic stripe card Flat fare 2010 Pilot of open payment/




PATH SmartLink Smartcard Flat fare
Salt Lake City Utah Transit 
Authority
PayWave Open payment/NFC Distance-based
Philadelphia SEPTA Key Open Payment/NFC Distance and time-
based
In “pre-pilot” phase, launch date 
TBD
Los Angeles LACMTA TAP Smartcard Flat fare
Atlanta MARTA Breeze Card Smartcard Flat fare
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for both parties in an open-loop system (2011, 651). 
The transit agency would gain a small revenue stream 
from participating merchants in an advertising 
contract, while the merchants gain increased 
consumer exposure in a captive setting. 
Equity considerations for disadvantaged riders, 
particularly unbanked riders, are a major concern for 
agencies implementing smartcards. Because transit 
agencies in the US must meet equity obligations 
such as Title VI, low-income un(der)banked transit 
riders must be accommodated. One problem is 
that smartcards often require an initial deposit or 
“prepayment”, which low-income riders may be 
unable to meet (Quibria, 2008 19). To accommodate 
the un(der)banked in smartcard implementation, 
Kocur argues that government-issued EBT cards (an 
open-loop prepaid debit card) could theoretically 
be incorporated as valid payment in an open 
payment environment (2010, 14). Another strategy 
for an open payment system is to distribute agency-
issued prepaid cards at retail locations or even 
bank ATM’s (ibid). This strategy would require the 
transit agency to negotiate the terms of the prepaid 
cards effectively with the card provider, such that 
prepayment fees are waived and inequitable fee 
structures (relative to mainstream bank cards) are 
avoided. Likewise, undocumented riders will not 
be able to use open-loop smartcards that require 
personal identification and registration (Kocur, 2010, 
15). Visa has developed an open-loop prepaid card 
reloadable up to $1,000 that has no registration 
requirement and does not allow cash withdrawals, 
making it ideal for transit agency implementation 
(ibid). However, because few of these solutions have 
been sufficiently articulated, “layering” has been the 
dominant approach most American transit agencies 
have taken (McDonald, 2000, 22). Layering refers 
to an implementation in which smartcards, cash 
payments, and older magnetic stripe cards are each 
accepted. This reiterates the common theme in 
American smartcard research that for equity reasons, 
the cash payment option must be preserved (Joshi, 
2011, 62). 
The un(der)banked, therefore, are an important 
community of concern in transportation planning as 
many public transit agencies begin to transition to 
new integrated fare payment systems. Adopting a 
new fare payment system that deprecates, penalizes, 
inconveniences or prohibits fare transactions not 
originating in a traditional bank account would be 
considered a highly inequitable policy and may even 
expose transit agencies to Title VI litigation. Agencies 
must carefully consider implementation alternatives 
of new fare payment technologies such that both 
banked and unbanked riders are accommodated 
while still realizing these technologies’ numerous 
benefits.  
Prepaid Debit Cards in an 
Open Payment System
Contactless, prepaid debit cards are highly 
relevant for transit agencies seeking to 
accommodate un(der)banked customers 
on an open-loop smartcard fare payment 
system because they have similar point-of-sale 
capabilities to bank cards yet do not require the 
consumer to have a mainstream bank account. 
Prepaid debit cards represent one of the 
fastest growing segments of consumer financial 
services; since 2006, the total volume of prepaid 
transactions in the United States has grown 
46% (Keitel, 2012, 4). Also known as “stored 
value cards,” prepaid debit cards are reloadable 
payment cards in which cash value is loaded 
onto the card before it can be used to transact. 
Although prepaid debit cards use the same 
technology as retailer-branded “gift cards,” 
prepaid debit cards are generally open-loop 
– known in the payments industry as “general-
purpose reloadable” (GPR) – and can be used 
at a variety of venues, whereas gift cards are 
typically limited to a single store brand. Because 
a significant portion of transit riders are un(der)
banked, transit agencies increasingly see 
prepaid debit cards as a means of achieving 
their intended operational cost savings of 
open-loop smartcards while also providing 
some degree of equity as cash-based payment 
operations are gradually phased out. There are 
also opportunities for transit agencies to share 
the revenues earned on fees from prepaid card 
retail transactions with the card companies.
Prepaid debit cards serve as an alternative to 
cash or checks and have tremendous potential to 
provide a means for unbanked consumers to pay 
for daily necessities while avoiding many of the 
obstacles that mainstream banking institutions 
present to lower-income consumers. Jacob et 
al summarize the potential benefits of prepaid 
debit cards as the following: they generally lack 
identification requirements; they can be purchased 
at many non-bank retail locations such as check 
cashers, convenience stores, and gas stations; they 
provide immediate availability of funds at a cost that 
is often lower than the ATM fees mainstream banks 
typically charge for small transactions; and they 
are difficult to overdraft, reducing the likelihood of 
unexpected fees (2005, 3). Many of the more popular 
prepaid debit cards in the United States today are 
reloadable cards used for payroll or government 
benefits direct deposit that need not be linked to a 
bank account, and a growing number of providers 
now allow international remittances (ibid, 11). 
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One promising area of experimentation with 
prepaid debit cards is their use of transaction history 
to create a kind of hybrid bank account, effectively 
helping “bank the unbanked” (Prior and Santoma, 
2008). Prepaid cards have very similar ATM and 
point-of-sale capacities to credit or debit cards, 
but the key difference is that they can be reloaded 
through physical machines accessing an internal 
account network. They are therefore useful in that 
they provide the core functions of a bank account 
while avoiding the major hurdles that the unbanked 
face in acquiring traditional bank accounts. If 
implemented judiciously, prepaid debit cards may 
provide un(der)banked transit riders with entry to 
the wealth-building features that mainstream banks 
have largely dominated. Several prepaid debit card 
companies, such as Directo and NetSpend, have 
experimented with offering savings features with 
their cards (Jacob et al, 2005, 14). NetSpend, for 
instance, offers prepaid debit cards that include 
both prepaid and savings accounts. The savings 
account has features similar to a mainstream savings 
account, including free enrollment and up to six 
free monthly transfers, though there are still fees 
to withdraw money from the prepaid debit account 
(ibid, 15). Unfortunately, few prepaid debit card 
companies offer credit-building features that might 
allow unbanked consumers to leverage their credit 
history to qualify for home mortgage loans and other 
pathways to wealth creation. Credit building features 
are generally unavailable on prepaid cards because 
the national credit report bureaus have yet to agree 
upon a standard data reporting format for prepaid 
cards’ data which is still viewed as “non-credit data” 
(ibid, 16). This indicates that although prepaid 
debit cards may replicate most daily functions of a 
mainstream bank account, they alone are insufficient 
in resolving some of the larger barriers the un(der)
banked face in long-term savings and wealth 
creation.  
There have been several successful pilot projects 
of prepaid debit cards with these functions in the 
context of a transit fare payment system. The Los 
Angeles County Metro Transit Authority (LACMTA) 
piloted a transit smartcard, “TAP ReadyCARD,” 
with two available functions: a contactless bank 
card (managed by Visa) and a GPR prepaid debit 
card designed specifically for transit fare payment 
(managed by Ready Credit). Among the pilot’s 
consumers who used the TAP ReadyCARD, 37% 
used direct deposit to reload their cards, compared 
to 82% of Ready Credit customers using a more 
traditional retail-oriented GPR prepaid debit card 
that was not branded for transit (Keitel, 2012, 18). In 
addition, TAP ReadyCARD customers had an average 
transaction size of 60% less than the traditional 
retail prepaid customers (ibid). This leads to one of 
three conclusions: 1) transit-branded prepaid cards 
were less likely to be seen as the customer’s primary 
account; 2) transit-branded prepaid customers in 
Los Angeles have less disposable income than the 
population using non-transit-branded prepaid cards; 
or 3) transit-branded prepaid customers are less 
likely to have direct deposit enabled than consumers 
using a non-transit prepaid card.  
Although there is not yet an academic 
consensus on whether prepaid debit cards offer 
low-income consumers a less expensive financial 
service compared to AFS, mounting evidence 
suggests that the prepaid card fee structures may 
be even more burdensome. Many prepaid cards 
distributed through state unemployment benefits 
programs charge fees for customer services such 
as using an ATM or speaking to a customer service 
representative over the phone (Valenti and Heiss, 
2013, p.4). Likewise, Ready Credit’s transit-branded 
prepaid card in Los Angeles charged their customers 
a $0.95 fee to check their balance and a $1.95 fee 
to withdraw cash at an ATM (Keitel, 2012, 22). These 
fees are in addition to the other ATM service fees 
typically charged by banks and retailers, effectively 
reducing pay or benefits. Especially problematic for 
transit agencies is the possibility that prepaid debit 
cards, if designed with unfavorable terms of use or 
fee structures, may be considered discriminatory 
against the un(der)banked if they were distributed as 
part of the fare payment system. 
The Case of 
Chicago’s Ventra
Chicago Transit Authority’s recently 
implemented fare payment system, Ventra, is 
the first large-scale, open-loop smartcard in the 
United States. Ventra may offer the clearest 
prelude to the challenges and opportunities 
the New York MTA is likely to face in rolling 
out the next Metro Card. Like the Ready Credit 
pilot in Los Angeles, Ventra was designed as a 
dual-purpose transit fare payment smartcard 
(linked to a mainstream bank account) and 
prepaid debit card for non-transit purposes. 
Ventra is a public-private partnership between 
the Chicago Transit Authority, MasterCard 
(payment processor), and FirstData (prepaid 
card manager). The prepaid card functionality 
was intended as a means of including Chicago’s 
significant portion of un(der)banked transit 
riders who would be unable to link their Ventra 
cards to a bank account (Hilkevitch, 2013). 
Un(der)banked riders now have the choice of 
either buying a Ventra card with built-in prepaid 
debit card functionality or buying a disposable 
contactless single-ride ticket for a fare of $3, 
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which includes a $0.50 convenience fee5 (Swartz, 
2013).  Because this fare is higher than the 
regular “base fare” of $2.25, a relatively small 
portion, about 4%, of Chicago transit riders 
bought single-ride tickets in 2012 (Cox, 2013).
Since the launch of Ventra in summer 2013, 
Chicago transit riders been beset by fare system 
technical failures, hidden customer charges and 
fees, and what was widely seen as an inadequate 
public outreach process. The Chicago Transit 
Authority commissioned a Fare Equity Analysis in 
June 2013 that stopped short of analyzing the fee 
structure of Ventra’s prepaid debit cards (Nancy 
Whelan Consulting, 2013). Instead the Equity 
Analysis focused on the geographic distribution of 
retail establishments where riders could purchase 
or reload their Ventra cards. Residents within one-
third of a mile of a Ventra retailer were considered to 
have equitable access to the fare payment system. 
By this metric, the study found that Ventra created 
neither “disparate impacts” on minority communities 
nor “disproportionate burdens” on low-income 
populations (ibid, 26). The impact of Ventra prepaid 
card fees was not evaluated because non-transit 
retail transactions are managed by the card network 
and therefore are considered to be out of the 
purview of the Chicago Transit Authority6. 
 However, the fee structure of prepaid 
debit cards like Ventra for non-transit transactions 
should give transit agencies pause as they 
consider distributing these banking instruments to 
large, un(der)banked communities who may lack 
mainstream banking experience. Ventra’s standard 
fees7 include  a $2 fee for riders requesting paper 
copies of their transaction history, $2 fee for calling 
the Ventra customer service center, a fee of $1.50 for 
ATM withdrawals, a $5 monthly fee for inactivity on 
the transit function and a $2 monthly fee for inactivity 
on the prepaid card function (Hilkevitch, 2013a). 
According to a recent analysis, Ventra’s prepaid debit 
card costs the typical customer $188 in annual fees, 
compared to just $39 in annual fees the highest-
rated prepaid debit card from U.S. Bank (Hilkevtich, 
2013b). Riders, according to some accounts, have 
been routinely double and triple-charged for fares 
and experienced hour-long wait times with customer 
service representatives based out-of-state (Zimmer, 
2013). Some riders even reported being charged 
twice for a single ride due to the simple error of 
exiting a bus through the front doors, triggering 
Ventra’s contactless RFID scanner (Hilkevitch, 2013). 
5 Cash payment is still allowed on Chicago Transit Authority’s 
buses (Swartz, 2013). Banked riders may also pay using contact-
less credit or debit cards.
6 Candace Brakewood, Personal Interview.
7 This does not include two additional fees Ventra withdrew 
in response to public opposition, a $2.95 fee for reloading an 
account balance online using a credit card and a $10 per hour fee 
for disputing fraudulent charges (Hilkevitch, 2013b). 
While the prepaid card function may fulfill the 
Chicago Transit Authority’s objectives of reducing 
cash handling operations and enabling the un(der)
banked to pay for transit fares electronically, it is 
clear that Ventra’s hidden fees make it an opaque 
and inequitable solution when non-transit prepaid 
transactions are considered. In the words of Linda 
Sherry of the non-profit Consumer Action, “Why 
should public transit agencies be involved in making 
interchange fees off people? These are supposed 
to be public-serving agencies, and a fee-laden card 
isn’t exactly a public service” (qtd. in Hilkevitch, 
2013a). To put this in the perspective of potential 
Title VI litigation, a transit riders’ group could 
conceivably argue that the Ventra fare payment 
system discriminates against the un(der)banked by 
compelling these riders to pay more in aggregate 
fees compared to the banked for the same consumer 
behavior. Prepaid cards are therefore merely the 
technological means necessary to accommodate 
the un(der)banked in an open-loop smartcard 
system, but by no means do they ensure equitable or 
transparent outcomes. 
The MTA’s Contactless 
Metro Card
Implementing specific fare payment 
accommodations or alternatives for unbanked 
transit riders may enable the MTA to avoid 
inequitable policy outcomes. In an exploratory 
2010 study, the MTA indicated that a major 
objective of its new “Contactless Metro Card” 
would be to provide equal access for both 
unbanked and banked customers (Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority, 2010, 36). The MTA, 
in conjunction with New Jersey Transit and 
the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey, 
successfully tested contactless fare payment 
technology on the Lexington Line and several 
bus routes in a 2010 pilot project serving 17,000 
riders8. The 2010 pilot was intended only to test 
the feasibility of contactless technology and did 
not measure customer acceptance nor the local 
market penetration of contactless bank cards 
(Carr, 2012). An MTA spokesperson clarified 
that the intent of the pilot was to ensure that 
“contactless” payments could be securely 
implemented; that the payment method could 
allow customers to transfer seamlessly across all 
regions of the system, from the MTA’s subway 
stations and buses to New Jersey Transit to 
Path trains; and that the system could endure 
8 MasterCard and CitiBank installed readers at 30 Lexington Av-
enue Line stations; CitiBank customers with MasterCard PayPass™ 
devices entered the system by tapping directly at the readers on 
the subway turnstiles (Metropolitan Transit Authority, 2010, 16).
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tough conditions (e.g. it would still work on 
a bumpy bus ride), and work with multiple 
brands, including MasterCard and Visa” (ibid). 
It is ultimately expected that the MTA will roll 
out a new contactless Metro Card by 2022, at 
a cost of at least $450 million (Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority, 2015). 
However, it is unclear whether the MTA intends 
to include unbanked customers in a Contactless 
Metro Card by implementing a prepaid debit card 
or by simply preserving existing cash payment 
alternatives to the smartcard it ends up adopting. 
It also remains to be seen whether the MTA’s next 
Metro Card will be an open-loop or closed-loop 
system9. To pay for transit, options for unbanked 
riders instead of bank cards are 1) paying cash; 2) 
transit-issued, closed-loop contactless smartcards 
like Boston’s “CharlieCard”; 3) transit-issued, 
open-loop, contactless prepaid debit cards like 
Chicago’s “Ventra”; and 4) card network-issued, 
closed-loop prepaid debit cards (like the New York 
toll payment system, “EZ-Pass”) (SmartCard Alliance 
Transportation Council, 2008). Another option for 
implementation is a multi-tiered “layering” system, 
in which transit-issued smartcards are introduced 
while the agency also preserves the older magnetic 
stripe fare payment system of today’s MetroCard that 
would continue to accept cash payment (Brower and 
Henderson, 2004, 8). The MTA’s own documentation 
for its new fare payment system acknowledges 
that an open payment system would have greater 
difficulty accommodating un(der)banked riders than 
either a closed-loop smartcard or the existing Metro 
Card and may require multiple fare payment systems 
running in parallel (Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority, 2011, 17). In order to articulate an 
equitable transit fare payment system for the next 
Metro Card, this investigation undertook two 
qualitative research methods – intercept surveys and 
structured interviews – to achieve two objectives. 
The first objective was to understand travel behavior 
of un(der)banked transit riders in New York City. The 
second objective was to consult a variety of transit 
fare policy experts on emerging Best Practices for 
the inclusion of un(der)banked transit riders in a 
smartcard-based fare payment system.
9 As of this writing, the MTA has yet to announce a formal RFP 
for its new fare payment system, so its technological format 
remains unknown. (Gary Roth, Personal Interview).
Methodology
 
This study conducted an exploratory 
travel behavior survey of transit riders in 
neighborhoods with high portions of un(der)
banked residents. According to existing 
literature, no publicly available survey has 
yet been performed in New York City that 
gathered information on both travel behavior 
and financial services participation. Therefore 
one of the objectives of this investigation was to 
propose and evaluate a research methodology 
that explores the intersection between un(der)
banked communities, travel behavior and transit 
fare policy. 
There are three existing pieces of research that 
cover similar subject matter in New York City but 
that stop short of addressing the intersection of 
unbanked communities and transit fare payment. 
First, the NYC Department of Consumer Affairs’ 
Office of Financial Empowerment completed a 
survey of unbanked communities in the city in 
2011, the Citywide Financial Services Study (CFSS). 
Through a contract with the Acxiom Corporation and 
the non-profit Social Compact, the study estimated 
the number of unbanked individuals in each NYC 
Community District using a variety of data types 
as potential indicators of unbanked status10 (NYC 
Department of Consumer Affairs, 2011) . These data 
included debt-to-income ratios, FICO credit scores, 
home equity, homeownership rates, locations of AFS 
and mainstream banks, and other demographics. 
The data were then compiled into a numerical index 
ranging from 1-20 that represented an individuals’ 
level of traditional finance participation. A score of 
“1” indicated that an individual is unbanked and has 
no relationship with traditional finance institutions. 
The results of the CFSS were a series of aggregate 
totals of un(der)banked individuals within each 
of the 51 Community Districts of New York City. 
Although the sub-District-level data of the CFSS 
were proprietary and unavailable for public use11, the 
aggregate data provided at the District level were 
sufficient to create generalized maps of New York 
City’s un(der)banked population. As shown in Figure 
10 The detailed methodology of the Citywide Financial Services 
Study can be found here.
11 Kate Glynn-Broderick, Personal Interview.
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1, the distribution of un(der)banked individuals in 
New York City is highly varied and closely aligns 
with the city’s existing socioeconomic inequalities of 
income, race and ethnicity.
The second source is the New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Council’s (NYMTC) 2009 
Environmental Justice Assessment for the MTA. 
This report does not explore the issues of un(der)
banked communities or fare policy directly, but does 
highlight Census tracts where transportation equity 
is likely to be a concern. “Communities of concern” 
are those containing both high concentrations of 
ethnic minority residents (above 52%) and high 
portions of residents living in poverty (above 16%). 
As shown in Figure 4, these areas are almost identical 
to the neighborhoods the CFSS identified as having 
the greatest proportions of unbanked residents 
(Figure 1). 
Clifford Oppurum provides in-depth travel 
behavior statistics of New York City Transit 
commuters in Automated Fare Collection and Urban 
Public Transportation. In a comprehensive mail-in 
survey of 1,201 riders of the New York City Transit 
system, Oppurum received 232 survey responses 
on a variety of topics including travel behavior 
(trip frequency, origins/destinations, trip purpose), 
fare payment preferences (type of Metro Card 
purchased), and socioeconomic characteristics12. 
Perhaps because these surveys were performed in 
2002 – at a time when open-loop fare payment was 
not yet an MTA priority – respondents were not asked 
for information about how they pay for Metro Card, 
nor were they asked about the types of financial 
services they used. Nevertheless, Oppurum’s surveys 
constitute a solid research foundation upon which to 
expand. The ultimate goal of this investigation will be 
to propose and evaluate a survey methodology that 
captures respondents’ fare payment preferences, 
travel behavior, and financial services participation.
To further articulate this New York City-based 
body of research, this study performed face-to-face 
intercept surveys in neighborhoods identified by 
the CFSS as having the city’s highest proportions 
of un(der)banked individuals, given in Table 4 
and Figure 1. The intent of these surveys is by 
no means to sample a statistically representative 
portion of the un(der)banked community in New 
York City. Due to limitations of time and funding, 
surveying the required number of respondents to be 
representative was not feasible13. Rather, the intent 
of the surveys was to isolate a particular population 
known to be socially and economically vulnerable – 
the un(der)banked) – and gain insights on their travel 
12 The MTA also collected these data in the 2008 New York 
Customer Travel Survey (Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 
2009, 43).
13 A statistically significant sample of New York City’s unbanked 
population of approximately 825,000 would require a sample of 
about 600 respondents, given a confidence interval of 4 and a 
confidence level of 95% (Richardson et al, 101).
behavior and fare payment preferences as well as 
provide side-by-side comparisons to the banked 
respondents. Ideally, future research could expand 
upon these surveys until a representative number 
of respondents are reached and more statistically 
significant relationships can be established. 
Two neighborhoods were selected for the 
intercept surveys: Fordham (53% unbanked, 45% 
underbanked) and Bushwick (47% unbanked, 
49% underbanked) (New York City Department 
of Consumer Affairs, 2011). As shown in Figure 
2 and Figure 3, these Community Districts also 
have some of the city’s lowest concentrations of 
mainstream financial institutions (compared to AFS 
establishments) as well as some of its lowest median 
household incomes. In selecting an appropriate 
survey location, three factors were considered: 
the proximity of MTA subway entrances, where 
the topic of transit fare policy will appear more 
immediately relevant; the proximity of AFS retail 
locations where un(der)banked consumers were 
likely to be present; and the location within a busy 
retail corridor with high pedestrian traffic to ensure a 
high respondent turnover. Surveys were completed 
on two weekdays and one Saturday during January 
2015. As an incentive for participation, respondents 
were provided with a single-issue, round-trip 
Metro Card of $5 value14. Survey respondents were 
solicited on public sidewalks of highly trafficked 
retail corridors indicated in Figure 5 and Figure 6 
and asked whether they would like to participate 
in a study aimed at improving the Metro Card in 
exchange for a $5 round-trip ticket. This form of 
compensation was chosen because of the transit-
focused nature of the survey questionnaire and 
because the Metro Cards would be available for the 
respondents’ immediate use. For purposes of data 
tabulation and coding, individuals who responded 
that they did not use any traditional bank account 
were categorized as unbanked, while those who 
used both traditional bank accounts and AFS were 
counted as underbanked. For clarity, these groups 
were consolidated into a single group, the un(der)
banked. This study required the purchase of 50 
round-trip Metro Cards from MTA station agents, 
at a cost of $300 covered by the William H. Kinne 
Fund of Columbia University’s Graduate School of 
Architecture, Planning & Preservation. 
This study also performed a series of semi-
structured interviews with transit policy experts 
responsible for implementing new fare payment 
systems. During the interviews, experts were 
engaged in conversation about new fare payment 
systems with emphasis around a series of questions: 
the agency’s rationale for adopting a new fare 
14 Each single-ride Metro Card includes a $0.50 convenience 
fee levied in addition to the base fare amount, meaning that a 
round-trip Metro Card of $5 fare value costs $6.
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payment system; the benefits associated with the 
new fare payment system (real or anticipated); 
barriers to implementation of the fare payment 
system; and the agency’s means of accommodating 
un(der)banked transit riders. The collective purpose 
of these interviews was to enable comparisons to 
be made from across different transit agencies, 
regions, and fare payment systems. The results of 
these interviews are presented as a series of case 
studies. Case study analysis was selected as the 
research strategy because this investigation’s themes 
include emerging contemporary events and a high 
degree of particularity among each agency’s fare 
payment systems. According to Yin, “the distinctive 
need for case studies arises out of the desire to 
understand complex social phenomena” because 
they “allow investigators to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events,” such 
as high-level managerial or organizational changes, 
for example (2013, 3). Case studies are the preferred 
strategy when “how or “why” questions are being 
posed, when the investigator has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary 
phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin, 
2013, pp. 6-11). The case study analytical framework 
is similar to that explored in Anders et al but with 
additional emphasis placed on policy solutions for 
accommodating un(der)banked transit riders (2014, 
8). In the context of this investigation, both the rider 
surveys and case studies are considered exploratory 
because there is no existing dataset cataloguing the 
impacts of fare policy on the un(der)banked; it is very 
much a matter still being negotiated and explored by 
transit policy experts. A mixture of experts from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors was selected to 
include a range of organizational perspectives. Table 
2 includes a list of individuals who were interviewed.
Table 2: Case Study Sources
Metropolitan Area Organization Name Title
London, UK Transport for London Andrew Anderson Customer Experience Manager
New York, NY City College of New York Candace Brakewood Professor, Civil Engineering
Chicago, IL Chicago Metropolitan Planning 
Council
Yonah Freemark Project Manager
Philadelphia, PA Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority (SEPTA)
Jerry Kane Manager of Capital Program Planning
Boston, MA Masabi, LLC Josh Robin Vice President of Business Development
New York, NY Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (MTA)
Gary Roth Bus Technology Manager





Derek Toups Senior Project Manager
Hypotheses
This study began with five distinct hypotheses 
about the travel behavior of the un(der)banked in 
New York City. The intent of the intercept surveys 
was, to the extent possible, confirm or reject 
these hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Un(der)banked individuals 
are likely to have longer commutes 
and a larger average number of 
transfers than banked individuals. 
This hypothesis follows from a Pratt Institute 
study that concluded that low-income New 
Yorkers are more likely to have long commutes, 
in excess of sixty minutes, with more transfers, 
than the average New Yorker (Center for an 
Urban Future, 2011, 12). The un(der)banked are, 
of course, an overwhelmingly low-income cohort. 
Many low-income New York neighborhoods have 
inadequate transit service and are inaccessible 
to major employment centers. Therefore, this 
study predicted that un(der)banked respondents 
will be more likely than banked respondents to 
have commutes in excess of sixty minutes. This 
prediction is in keeping with Pratt’s finding that 
two-thirds of riders with long commutes have 
incomes below $35,000 (ibid), a threshold below 
which many consumers have difficulty acquiring 
and maintaining mainstream bank accounts.
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Hypothesis 2: Unbanked people are 
more likely to take multiple transit 
modes than the banked population. 
Brakewood and Kocur found that 69% of 
Chicago’s un(der)banked transit riders took both 
buses and trains, versus just 53% of banked riders 
(2012, 7). This may be due to the reality that 
lower income transit riders face longer commutes 
that require intermodal transfers, reflecting the 
assumptions of Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 3: Unbanked people are less likely 
to receive assistance in paying for Metro Card. 
The MTA currently gives discounted Metro Card 
fares to certain groups such as public school 
students and seniors. Other commuters receive 
tax-free Metro Cards as a benefit through their 
employers (MTA, 2009, 11). However, this study 
predicted that un(der)banked transit riders are 
less likely to receive these discounted fares 
because doing so generally requires identity 
verification. Reflecting the findings of Joassart-
Marcelli and Stephens, this study predicts 
that the un(der)banked are more likely than 
the general population to be undocumented 
non-citizens and therefore unable to receive 
discounted transit fares for which they would 
otherwise be eligible. 
Hypothesis 4: Unbanked people are 
more likely to buy Weekly Unlimited 
MetroCards than other types. 
This hypothesis reflects the reality that as a 
predominantly low-income group, the un(der)
banked are likely to have precarious personal 
finances and are less likely to have the 
disposable income necessary to spend $11215 
on a Monthly Unlimited Metro Card in a single 
installment. It is more likely that un(der)banked 
riders still desire to save on a per-ride basis 
by buying the Weekly Unlimited and avoid the 
convenience fee of a Single-Ride ticket. Of all 
Metro Card types, the Weekly Unlimited had the 
lowest median income of riders surveyed in the 
MTA’s 2008 New York Customer Travel Survey, 
at just $37,600 versus the median income of 
$63,400 for buyers of the Monthly Unlimited 
and $55,200 systemwide (Kazis, 2010). The only 
15 A Monthly Unlimited Metro Card costs $116.50, as of the MTA’s 
late March 2015 fare hike.
group with a lower median income was riders 
paying cash on MTA buses only; their median 
income was $36,200 (ibid). 
Hypothesis 5: Un(der)banked 
individuals are equally likely to own 
smartphones as banked individuals. 
Unlike mainstream bank accounts, mobile phones 
typically do not require identity verification or 
credit history in the United States to qualify. 
Unlike mainstream banks, most mobile phone 
carriers have widespread retail networks in lower-
income neighborhoods, often with extended 
hours of service. Many mobile phone carriers 
offer flexible contracts and payment plans that 
reduce the cost of ownership, which is partly 
responsible for the high market penetration 
of smartphones in the US. With a market 
penetration of 75% in the United States16, it is 
reasonable to expect no difference in prevalence 
of ownership between banked and un(der)
banked communities. 
16 Josh Robin, Personal Interview.
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Data Sources
Table 3: Data Sources on New York City’s 
Unbanked Population and Travel Behavior












New York City 
Department of 
Consumer Affairs









2010 No Yes No Yes
Survey of Income 
and Program 
Participation
U.S. Census Bureau 2008 Yes No Yes Yes
Table 4: New York City Neighborhoods with 
















Ratio of Traditional 
Financial Services 
to AFS Locations
Bushwick Brooklyn Brooklyn CD 4 2 0.6 19 5.8 0.1
Highbridge, Concourse Bronx Bronx CD 4 5 1.1 21 4.5 0.2
Morris/University 
Heights, Fordham
Bronx Bronx CD 5 6 1.5 26 6.5 0.2
Brownsville, Ocean Hill Brooklyn Brooklyn CD 16 2 0.7 13 4.3 0.2
East Tremont, Bathgate, 
Belmont, West Farms
Bronx Bronx CD 6 5 1.9 15 5.8 0.3
Melrose, Morrisania, 
Claremont
Bronx Bronx CD 3 4 1.6 11 4.4 0.4
Crown Heights South, 
Prospect Lefferts 
Gardens
Brooklyn Brooklyn CD 9 4 1.1 8 2.2 0.5
East Harlem Manhattan Manhattan 
CD 11
10 2.1 21 4.4 0.5
Hunts Point, Longwood Bronx Bronx CD 2 8 5.2 13 8.5 0.6
Castle Hill, Parkchester Bronx Bronx CD 9 13 2.1 24 3.9 0.6
Source: Citywide Financial Services Study, New York City 
Department of Consumer Affairs, 2011
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Table 5: New York City Neighborhoods with Least Banking Penetration






























































47 50  29,893  97 $361,344  16 $40,980
Bushwick Brooklyn 
CD 4
47 49  32,618  96 $422,077 16 $38,667




32 63  58,589  95 $382,214 24 $46,818
Flatbush, Rugby Brooklyn 
CD 17
27 68  56,770  95 $437,207  30 $54,871
Source: Citywide Financial Services Study, New York City Department of Consumer Affairs, 2011
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Table 6: New York City Transit Riders by Gender
Gender Percent of Sample
Male 37.5
Female 62.5
Source: Opurum, 2012, 113.
Table 7: New York City Transit Riders 
by Annual Household Income
Income Percent of Sample
Less than $10,000 8.2
$10,000 – 19,999 6.5
$20,000 – 29,999 18.5
$30,000 – 39,999 16.4
$40,000 – 49,999 17.2
$50,000 – 59,999 6.5
$60,000 – 69,999 4.3
$70,000 – 79,999 6.0
$80,000 – 89,999 3.9
$90,000 – 99,999 2.6
Greater than $100,000 9.9
Source: Oppurum, 2012, 116
Table 8: Frequency of Subway Use
Frequency of Subway Use Percent of Sample
Once Weekly 5.2
2-3 Times per Week 5.6
4-5 Times per Week 32.3
6 Times per Week 22.8
7 Times per Week 34.1
Source: Opurum, 2012, 116
Table 9: Trip Purpose









Source: Opurum, 2012, 120
Table 10: Market Share for Metro Card Ticket Types





Pay-Per-Ride MetroCard 50.9 43
Weekly Unlimited MetroCard 19.8 21
Monthly Unlimited MetroCard 17.7 29
Daily Unlimited MetroCard 
(discontinued)
4.7 N/A
All Unlimited Cards 42.2 50
Token (discontinued) 4.3 N/A
Other (Cash Payment on 
buses, Single-Ride Tickets)
2.6 7
Source: Opurum, 2012, 119; Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority, 2013
Table 11: Factors Influencing 
Metro Card Ticket Choice
Factor Percent of Sample
Frequency of Trip 56.0
Convenience of Ticket 22.4
Cost of Ticket 9.5
Income Level 6.9
Security of Ticket 3.0
Other 2.2
Source: Opurum, 2012, 122
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Unbanked and Underbanked Households (%)
 in New York City
¯












1. Fordham Road (Bronx CB 5)
2. Myrtle-Wycko (Brooklyn CB 4)
Figure 1: Un(der)banked Households in New York, by Community Board (%), 2011
Modified from New York City Department of Consumer Affairs (2011), Office of Financial Empowerment, Citywide Financial Services 
Survey
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Access to Financial Services in New York City
¯
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1. Fordham Road (Bronx CB 5)
2. Myrtle-Wycko (Brooklyn CB 4)
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Figure 2: Ratio of Traditional Finance Institutions to AFS Locations (2011)
Modified from New York City Department of Consumer Affairs (2011), Office of Financial Empowerment, Citywide Financial Services 
Survey
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Median Annual Household Income of 
New York City Community Boards, 2011
¯
0 4 8 12 162
Miles
Legend
Lowest Quintile ($32,209 - $46,000)
Second Quintile ($46,001 - $57,000)
Middle Quintile ($57,001 - $65,000)
Fourth Quintile $65,001 - $87,000)
Top Quintile ($87,001 - $173,000)
Data Collection Sites
1. Fordham Road (Bronx CB 5)
2. Myrtle-Wycko (Brooklyn CB 4)
1
2
Figure 3: New York City Community Districts by Average Household Income, Quintiles (2011)
Modified from New York City Department of Consumer Affairs (2011), Office of Financial Empowerment, Citywide Financial Services 
Survey
29 Privatizing the Metro Card | David Perlmutter | May 2015
Figure 4: “Communities of Concern” in the New York Region (NYMTC)
Source: New York Metropolitan Transportation Council, 2009.








Transportation & Land Use at Fordham Data Collection Site
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Figure 5: Transportation & Land Use Characteristics at Fordham Data Collection Site
Source: New York City PLUTO database
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Figure 6: Transportation & Land Use Characteristics at Myrtle-Wyckoff Data Collection Site
Source: New York City PLUTO database
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Survey Results
Table 12: Gender Breakdown of Survey Results
Banked Percent 
Banked
Un(der)banked Percent Un(der)banked Total
Female 10 45% 12 55% 22
Male 9 31% 20 69% 29
Total 19  37% 32 63% 51
Figure 7: Gender Breakdown of Survey Respondents
Figure 8: Age Breakdown of Survey Respondents
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Figure 9: Trip Purpose of Survey Respondents (for Most Recent Trip)
Table 13: Trip Purpose of Most Recent Trip
 Banked % Banked Un(der)banked % Un(der)
banked
Grand Total % of Total
Leisure/
Discretionary




12 44% 15 56% 27 53%
Grand Total 19 37% 32 63% 51 100%
Figure 10: Trip Length for Most Recent Trip
Table 14: Trip Length for Most Recent Trip
 Banked Percent Banked Un(der)banked Percent Un(der)
banked
Grand Total Percent of 
Total
Less than 30 mins 5 33% 10 67% 15 29%
30-60mins 10 38% 16 62% 26 51%
Greater than 60 
mins
4 40% 6 60% 10 20%
Grand Total 19  37% 32 63% 51  100%
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Figure 11: Trip Frequency of Survey Respondents
 Banked Percent Banked Un(der)banked Percent Un(der)
banked
Grand Total Percent of Total
Every Day 14 36% 25 64% 39 76%
Less than 
Every Day
5 42% 7 58% 12 24%
Grand Total 19 37% 32 63% 51 100%
Figure 12: Number of Transfers for Most Recent Trip
Number of 
Transfers
Banked Percent Banked Un(der)banked Percent Un(der)banked Grand Total
0 1 8% 12 92% 13
1 9 50% 9 50% 18
2 5 36% 9 64% 14
3 or more 4 67% 2 33% 6
Grand Total 19 37% 32 63% 51
Table 15: Trip Frequency of Survey Respondents
Table 16: Number of Transfers for Most Recent Trip
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Figure 13: Mode Choice for Most Recent Trip
 Banked Percent Banked Un(der)banked Percent Un(der)
banked
Grand Total Percent of 
Total
Bus 3 33% 6 67% 9 18%
Subway 5 29% 12 71% 17 33%
Multiple 11 44% 14 56% 25 49%
Grand Total 19 37% 32 63% 51 100%
Table 17: Mode Choice for Most Recent Trip
Figure 14: Payment Method for Most Recent Trip
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Figure 15: Point of Purchase for Most Recent Metro Card




Grand Total Percent of Total
MTA Stations 18 40% 27 60% 45 88%
Retail Outlets 1 17% 5 83% 6 12%
Grand Total 19 37% 32 63% 51 100%
Table 18: Point of Purchase for Most Recent Trip
Figure 16: Metro Card Type Most Recently Purchased
 Banked Percent Banked Un(der)banked Percent Un(der)
banked
Grand Total Percent of 
Total
Monthly Unlimited 3 43% 4 57% 7 14%
Weekly 9 41% 13 59% 22 43%
Pay As You Go 6 32% 13 68% 19 37%
Single Ride 1 33% 2 67% 3 6%
Grand Total 19 37% 32 63% 51 100%
Table 19: Type of Metro Card Most Recently Purchased
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Figure 17: Income of Survey Respondents
 Banked Percent Banked Un(der)banked Percent Un(der)
banked
Grand Total Percent of Total
Less than 
$40,000
12 35% 22 65% 34 67%
$40,000-79,999 4 44% 5 56% 9 18%
Greater than 
$80,000
1 50% 1 50% 2 4%
Declined 2 33% 4 67% 6 12%
Grand Total 19 37% 32 63% 51 100%
Table 20: Income of Survey Respondents
Figure 18: Smartphone Ownership
 Banked % Banked Un(der)banked % of Un(der)
banked
Grand Total % of Total
No 3 23% 10 77% 13 25%
Yes 16 42% 22 58% 38 75%
Grand Total 19 37% 32 63% 51 100%
Table 21: Smartphone Ownership
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Case Study Results
Chicago, Illinois
Former Fare Collection Methods 
and Rationale to Change 
Until 2013, Chicago Transit Authority operated 
the Chicago Card, a transit-issued, closed-loop 
contactless smartcard that could be purchased and 
reloaded at any CTA station, online or retail location. 
The primary motivation to adopt open payment was 
operational cost savings through outsourcing the 
card manufacturing, equipment maintenance and 
account management responsibilities to the private 
sector. CTA also desired an account-based system 
that would enable the agency to track passenger 
origins, destinations, and other travel behavior in 
greater detail for operations planning purposes. 
Description and Benefits of New 
Fare Payment System
Chicago Transit Authority’s bus and heavy rail 
modes now use Ventra, an open payment system 
launched in 2013. Ventra transit accounts can be 
reloaded at CTA stations, online, or at a network 
of retail locations using cash, credit or debit cards. 
Ventra requires a pre-payment fee of $5, although 
this fee was waived during the initial six-month rollout 
period. Metra, the commuter rail agency, continues 
to offer traditional, conductor-validated paper tickets 
and accepts Ventra card payments through a mobile 
application.
Barriers to Implementation
Ventra received widespread negative media 
attention for several reasons: technical issues 
with Ventra payments on buses; high service fees 
on Ventra prepaid debit cards for non-transit 
transactions; and general passenger resistance to the 
system. The transition to Ventra caused a series of 
highly publicized technical issues on buses because 
of Ventra’s account-based orientation. Ventra must 
access a cloud-based account server to process a 
passenger’s transit fare payment, whereas previously 
under the Chicago Card the fare readers read/wrote 
information directly onto the card and required very 
little processing time. Although CTA buses are WiFi-
equipped to speed transaction processing, access to 
the account servers can become disrupted if the WiFi 
is not functioning properly. The contract between 
CTA and First Data for prepaid debit card fees on 
non-transit transactions involved very high fees 
and service charges that arguably could have been 
avoided with a more equitable contract. Locally, 
Ventra fits into a larger narrative of poorly managed 
public-private partnerships and the privatization 
of public services such as charter schools and 
parking meters. Finally, Ventra faced significant 
passenger resistance surrounding two issues: the fee 
structure of the prepaid debit cards on non-transit 
transactions, and the fact that single-ride tickets not 
linked to a Ventra Card (using a contactless paper 
ticket) were more expensive than the regular base 
fare. The latter policy was seen as discriminatory 
against low-income people who could not afford to 
pre-pay the $5 for a Ventra contactless card.
Means of Accommodating Un(der)
banked Transit Riders
The CTA promoted Ventra prepaid debit cards 
(for non-transit purchases) as an opportunity for 
un(der)banked people to access all of the benefits 
of a mainstream bank account while avoiding the 
obstacles presented to low-income people by 
mainstream banks themselves. In theory, this CTA 
effort has much in common with other municipalities’ 
initiatives to provide municipal identification cards 
to protect undocumented residents. However, given 
the high fees and unfavorable terms of the cards, 
the value of this public service was questionable. 
Stronger contract negotiations between CTA and the 
prepaid card company, First Data, may have resulted 
in lower fees and a more equitable card for un(der)
banked passengers and consumers. 
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Boston, Massachusetts
Current Fare Collection Methods 
and Rationale to Change
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 
(MBTA) currently operates a closed-loop, contactless 
smartcard, “Charlie Card,” for subway, light rail, and 
bus transportation.  Passengers pay for subway, light 
rail and bus rides at fare gates in station entrances or 
fareboxes in the front of vehicles. However, ferry and 
commuter rail transit does not accept Charlie Card. 
MBTA employees manually check tickets on these 
modes. In an effort to improve customer service 
and reduce operating expenses, MBTA advocated 
the expansion of Charlie Card fare collection on 
commuter rail in the late 2000’s. Due to the relatively 
low ridership on MBTA commuter rail, however, it was 
determined that the $70 million cost of expanding 
Charlie Chard fare collection infrastructure and 
$10 million annual operations expense could not 
be offset by the commuter railroad’s relatively low 
ridership17. The MBTA desired to change from a high-
cost fare collection model, cash payment and fare 
vending machines dispensing only paper tickets, to 
a lower-cost model incorporating a larger share of 
mobile fare payment transactions. 
Description and Benefits of New 
Fare Payment System
MBTA officials partnered with Masabi, LLC, a 
private-sector firm specializing in mobile payment 
and NFC technology. Instead of expanding Charlie 
Card, the agency chose to develop a customized 
mobile payment system through a contract with 
Masabi. They developed a mobile application 
that would display commuter rail tickets with a 
unique barcode and watermark security feature 
to be validated visually by train conductors. The 
implementation of the mobile application, mTicket, 
was very fast by industry standards, about four 
months between initial development and pilot 
release; full rollout took place within a year. This 
technology is neither contactless nor NFC and 
therefore not inter-operable with other modes of 
transit. MBTA declined to pursue NFC partly because 
of security concerns over NFC applications like 
Apple Pay or Google Wallet having access to agency 
fare payment data. Agency studies also showed 
that NFC had a very low market penetration of less 
than one percent, making it of limited value for 
widespread adoption. In addition, there were agency 
concerns that contactless cards lacked adequate 
market penetration to be a viable fare payment 
17 Josh Robin, Personal Interview.
method, which precluded any implementation of 
open payment. Mobile payment, on the other hand, 
was seen as an easier technological alternative 
given the widespread market penetration of mobile 
phones (over 75% in most commuter rail passenger 
markets18). 
Barriers to Implementation
There were no major barriers to implementation 
of the MBTA’s mobile ticket program, which had an 
unusually fast rollout period and no major issues 
reported. Visually validated mobile payment appears 
to have few obstacles to implementation in a proof-
of-payment fare collection system like commuter rail. 
Means of Accommodating Un(der)
banked Transit Riders
Cash payment continues to be accepted at MBTA 
commuter rail stations, as before. Because mobile 
payment applications require a link to a customer’s 
bank account, they currently provide no means of 
accommodating un(der)banked riders. Therefore, 
mobile payment may help transit agencies reduce 
their operating expenses from cash fare collection 
equipment, but not eliminate them entirely. 
London, U.K.
Former Fare Collection Methods 
and Rationale to Change 
Oyster Card, the closed-loop smartcard, was 
introduced as part of a large infrastructure project 
that replaced and upgraded much of the fare 
collection technology within London’s transit system. 
The move to implement Oyster Card in 2003 had 
three motivations: to protect against fare fraud and 
evasion on the Underground, reduce operating 
expenses, and to improve speed of passenger 
ingress on all transport modes. Implementation 
included “installing modern fare gates within the 
Underground metro, replacing all bus electronic 
ticket machines, upgrading self-service ticket 
vending machines, upgrading staff controlled ticket 
office vending machines, new accounting system 
and ‘back office’ controls and the expansion and 
upgrades to all our retail outlets selling tickets within 
London.19” TfL introduced contactless smartcards 
to enable faster throughput at stations as well as 
electronic ticket checking on buses to speed up 
bus boarding and reduce bus travel times. The 
decision to deploy the smartcard was not subject 
to a participatory planning process, although TfL 
18 Josh Robin, Personal Interview.
19 Andrew Anderson, Personal Interview.
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Table 22: Selected Case Studies of New Fare Payment Systems
MTC is the regional metropolitan planning organization responsible for implementing Clipper Card, the regional transit smartcard. 
Individual modes operated include BART (Heavy Rail), SF Muni (Light Rail, Urban Bus), and CalTrain (Commuter Rail), etc.
King County Metro is the largest transit agency in the Seattle metropolitan area and is responsible for 
managing ORCA, the regional transit smartcard. KC Metro runs Urban Bus services. Other participating 
agencies include Sound Transit (Light Rail, Commuter Rail) and Community Transit (Suburban Bus).
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did perform significant worldwide due diligence 
prior to implementation. The primary means of 
ensuring a successful Oyster Card launch was 
the implementation of a new fare policy, which 
encouraged the use of Oyster by creating a fares 
differential between Pay As You Go fares on Oyster 
and legacy magnetic stripe tickets20. 
Description and Benefits of New 
Fare Payment System
The Oyster Card project was financed with 
a public/private consortium, known in the U.K. 
as a Private Finance Initiative. In the 1990s, this 
was a common method of enabling public sector 
investment by getting private sector resources 
to invest upfront with the benefits realized over 
a longer timeframe. The private finance initiative 
(PFI) is a procurement method that uses private 
sector capacity and public resources in order to 
deliver public sector infrastructure and/or services 
according to a specification defined by the public 
sector. Oyster Card operations today are maintained 
by Cubic Corporation, although the program is still 
managed by Transport for London. Oyster Card 
has enabled Transport for London to achieve faster 
passenger throughput at stations, more seamless 
intermodal transfers, and more complex pricing 
schemes that vary according to trip distance, time 
of day and travel mode. In addition, the widespread 
market penetration of Oyster Card (greater than 80% 
as of 2012) enabled Transport for London to eliminate 
cash payment on buses in the summer of 2014. Bus 
passengers must now pay with a contactless bank 
card or the Oyster Card, which can be purchased 
with cash at any Tube station as well as many retail 
locations. The main savings were through the costs 
of cash fare collection. This had to be balanced 
against a loss of revenue since cash bus fares were 
higher (£2.40 compared with £1.50 for Oyster and 
contactless), although with the vast majority of the 
ridership using contactless or Oyster this ended 
up being a net gain for TfL.  In addition to Oyster 
Card, Transport for London also began accepting 
fare payment via contactless bank cards in 2012. 
TfL’s fare payment system is therefore considered 
open payment, in that both Oyster Card and other 
contactless cards are accepted at all fare readers, 
which account for 14% of all TfL transactions in 
201421. 
Barriers to Implementation
Transport for London faced significant challenges 
in the elimination of cash payment on buses in 2014. 
While only 1% of fare transactions were paid in cash 
20 As of January 2015, single-ride cash tickets in Central London 
for the Tube cost £4.80, compared to just £2.30 for Oyster pay-
ments (Transport for London, 2015).
21 Andrew Anderson, Personal Interview.
by late 201322, the phasing out of cash payment 
presented equity challenges that required further 
study. A rider survey of passengers paying all cash 
for buses revealed that 89% of these passengers had 
bank accounts, and 57% had Oyster Cards (Transport 
for London, 2011, 8). The primary motivations for 
paying all cash, as opposed to the faster option of 
Oyster, were forgetting to carry their Oyster Card, 
forgetting to reload their account balance and 
non-residence in London. Less than one percent 
of frequent cash riders cited not having a bank 
account as their reason for paying in cash (ibid, 15). 
Ensuring a ubiquitous network of retail locations 
for Oyster Card purchases and reloading, as well as 
proactive consumer education well in advance of 
the implementation of cashless bus fare payment, 
were instrumental to the program’s success among 
un(der)banked and cash-paying riders. In addition, 
TfL implemented a fare policy known as “contactless 
acceptance,” where fare readers on buses would 
accept an Oyster payment even if the rider’s balance 
was less than the full fare of £1.50, provided the 
balance is greater than zero (£0.00) (Transport for 
London, 2015). This policy was based on the cashless 
bus rider surveys, which showed that many cash fares 
came from people who did not have enough money 
on their Oyster Cards to use them.  This “last bus 
home” policy enables low-income riders to take one 
last bus journey within a twelve-hour window, after 
which they must top off their Oyster balance before 
riding again.  
Means of Accommodating Un(der)
banked Transit Riders
Part of the TfL contract with Cubic Corporation 
included the expansion and management of a retail 
network to support Oyster Card facilities. Because 
TfL’s Tube stations are not evenly spread throughout 
London, greater effort was made to plug these gaps 
using Oyster Ticket Stops . TfL set rules preventing 
agents (mostly local convenience stores) from 
being too close to each other or to one of our own 
managed ticket offices, and a contract managing 
the agent network has targets for each local area as 
to how many agents are deemed necessary in each 
neighborhood. The contractor is responsible for 
determining suitability, and they way in which TfL 
collects payment (by direct debit) means that the 
risks of non-payment are low. This contract helps 
to ensure that TfL’s network of retail Ticket Stops 
are widespread, so that un(der)banked riders who 
wish to pay cash top off of their balances may do so 
easily. For equity reasons, it is expected that TfL will 
continue to accept Oyster Cards (and its network of 
fare machines that accept cash payment) even if the 
agency outsources their production to a third party.
22 Andrew Anderson, Personal Interview.
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Generally, fare discounts – for students, senior 
citizens, the disabled, and the unemployed – are 
at the discretion of London’s Mayor and not TfL23. 
Therefore Oyster has been a means of delivering the 
fare discount, rather than discounts being enabled 
because of Oyster.  What Oyster has enabled is some 
control over fraud in discounted fares, by placing the 
photo ID on the discounted Oyster card to make it 
easier to identify that the holder is entitled to use the 
discount. 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Current Fare Collection Methods 
and Rationale to Change 
The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority (SEPTA) currently operates a fare collection 
system consisting of barriers for heavy rail and pay-
on-board for light rail, streetcars and buses. These 
fares currently can be paid with cash, magnetic 
stripe fare cards, or tokens. For commuter rail, 
SEPTA operates a zone-based fare system and has 
conductors validate paper tickets sold at station 
vending machines. Fares can be purchased as single-
ride tickets or daily, weekly, and monthly passes. 
SEPTA’s motivations for adopting a new, open-loop 
fare payment system were two-fold: first, to reduce 
the operations costs of supplying and maintaining 
its aging legacy fare payment system; second, to 
share with card companies – Xerox, the transaction 
processor, and Ready Credit, the prepaid debit card 
manager – in the revenues from interchange fees 
levied on prepaid card retail transactions. SEPTA, like 
New York MTA and New Jersey Transit, is considered 
one of the few major urban transit agencies to have 
never implemented a closed-loop, transit-issued 
contactless smartcard, making the technological 
transition to open payment all the more challenging. 
Description and Benefits of New 
Fare Payment System
SEPTA’s new fare payment system, “Key,” will 
combine two payment functions into a single smart 
card: a closed-loop, transit-only stored value card 
valid only for SEPTA purchases and an open-loop 
prepaid debit card that can be used for transit or 
non-transit, GPR transactions. Technologically, Key 
will be similar to Chicago’s Ventra or Utah Transit 
Authority’s open payment system. Key will be 
available for purchase online, at SEPTA stations, or at 
one of 1,500 retail establishments located in SEPTA 
service corridors. Users of the prepaid card for retail 
purchases will need to register their cards online or 
23 Andrew Anderson, Personal Interview.
at a SEPTA Customer Service location to activate the 
retail purse, a process that requires a Social Security 
number24. No such requirement exists for the transit-
only function of Key, which can be used immediately 
after purchasing. However, customers must register 
the prepaid cards online or at SEPTA customer 
service locations (and activate the retail function) in 
order to take advantage of benefits such as transit 
balance protection in the event the card is lost or 
stolen.
Barriers to Implementation
SEPTA indicated that the most significant barrier 
to implementation of Key was the education of 
passengers – particularly un(der)banked passengers 
– on prepaid debit cards in general as well as in the 
context of transit purchases. The agency recognized 
the difficulties Chicago Transit Authority’s Ventra 
program had in managing customer satisfaction 
during its initial rollout. SEPTA is marketing Key on a 
new agency website as “The All-in-One Card,” with 
a user experience directing passengers to choose 
whether to use Key exclusively for transit transactions 
or to activate the card’s retail functionality. A similar 
user experience is planned for SEPTA station 
fare machines. At both SEPTA stations and retail 
locations, cash payment will be accepted to reload 
either transit or GPR value25.
Consumer acceptance of Key’s prepaid debit 
cards will be critical for the success of the program 
given that other commonly used prepaid debit 
cards – EBT cards, university ID cards, and commuter 
benefits cards – have not yet adopted the contactless 
technology standard, ISO 14443. These cards, 
therefore, would not be able to communicate with 
the SEPTA card readers. Further inter-governmental 
coordination will be necessary for these payment 
methods to be able to be integrated into the Key 
open payment system. 
Means of Accommodating Un(der)
banked Transit Riders
For un(der)banked riders, SEPTA’s Key will 
issue reloadable prepaid debit cards that include 
two payment functions: one exclusively for transit 
purchases with no activation or additional fees 
required, and one that allows non-transit, retail 
purchases outside of SEPTA facilities. Key’s 
prepaid debit cards can be reloaded using cash 
at any of 1,500 retail locations, SEPTA stations, or 
SEPTA customer service locations. Underbanked 
24 The SEPTA Key personalized prepaid debit card has a prepay-
ment fee of $4.95 if the card is purchased at a SEPTA station or 
retail location. There is no prepayment fee for cards ordered 
online or at a SEPTA customer service office.
25 Payment industry regulations prevent passengers from 
reloading the GPR accounts of prepaid debit cards using a credit 
card. However, the transit account of Key will be able to be re-
loaded using credit or debit cards.
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passengers who already use other non-transit 
prepaid debit cards may also reload their transit 
balances online using these accounts. SEPTA Key’s 
GPR prepaid debit cards can also be linked to payroll 
direct deposit. This will enable passengers using 
payroll direct deposit to enjoy one of the primary 
benefits of mainstream financial bank accounts 
without encountering the obstacles these accounts 
may present to low-income consumers. 
One of the most significant changes expected 
with Key is the rapid expansion of the network of 
retail locations where SEPTA fare products are sold. 
Currently about 300 retail locations, mostly in central 
Philadelphia, sell legacy SEPTA magnetic stripe fare 
cards and tokens. Under the contract with Xerox 
and Ready Credit, SEPTA is required to expand this 
network to 1,500 retailers regionally. All stores must 
be located within one-quarter mile of bus stops 
and one-half mile of rail stations, reflecting the 
well-established thresholds of walkability for these 
modes. Many of these retail locations will leverage 
existing relationships with money transfer companies 
such as MoneyGram or Green Dot to facilitate reload 
transactions on both transit and GPR accounts. It is 
eventually anticipated that many of these companies 
may issue mobile payment applications linked to the 
prepaid debit cards of un(der)banked consumers 
and therefore enable transit mobile payment for the 
un(der)banked. However, prepaid card management 
companies would be responsible for any mobile 
application, and this matter is considered outside 
the purview of transit agencies’ decision-making 
authority. 
San Francisco Bay 
Area, California
Current Fare Collection Methods 
and Rationale to Change
The Metropolitan Transportation Commission 
(MTC) is the regional Metropolitan Planning 
Organization (MPO) responsible for contactless 
smartcard implementation in the San Francisco Bay 
Area. MTC oversees implementation across a highly 
fragmented transit landscape of 38 transit agencies 
between four counties. Of the 38 agencies under its 
jurisdiction, 26 have adopted the regional closed-
loop smartcard, Clipper26. Currently, Clipper is the 
preferred payment method among this group of 
agencies spanning nearly every public transit mode 
(heavy rail, commuter rail, light rail, streetcar, buses 
and ferries. Each of these modes, however, continues 
to operate legacy fare payment systems such as 
26 Derek Toups, Personal Interview.
paper or magnetic stripe tickets. According to MTC, 
95% of service hours in the region accept Clipper. 
Prior to Clipper, MTC oversaw an earlier closed-
loop smartcard called TransLink, which struggled to 
move beyond the pilot phase. MTC partnered with 
the Cubic Corporation in a Design/Build/Operate/
Maintain contract for both TransLink and Clipper. 
TransLink was rebranded in 2009 as Clipper as the 
imperative to implement contactless fare payment 
became stronger. The primary motivations to 
implement Clipper were to promote more seamless 
intermodal transfers, reduce operations costs from 
cash handling and reduce bus dwell times. As 
of 2015, MTC is considering a transition to open 
payment technology through updated contract 
with Cubic. Because the technology used in both 
closed-loop and open-loop smartcard systems is 
similar, most of the transition would be in the back-
end transaction processing standards. The main 
motivation for the transition from closed-loop to 
open payment is to further reduce the operating 
expense inherent in a closed-loop proprietary card. 
Description and Benefits of New 
Fare Payment System
Clipper uses a series of indicators to evaluate its 
performance such as: market penetration relative 
to other fare media, number of fare transactions 
(around 20 million per month), volume of revenue 
(about $40 million per month) and call center 
customer service metrics . As Clipper considers an 
eventual transition to open payment, MTC may opt 
to distribute Clipper-branded stored value cards 
managed by a private sector vendor. In this way, MTC 
can pass a larger share of the operating expense of 
fare collection to third parties and spend more on 
the provision of transit service. Especially attractive is 
the much larger retail network possible under such a 
scenario; with transit fare cards sold in retail outlets 
by private vendors the same way store-branded gift 
cards are today, the network of Clipper purchase and 
reload points may grow ten-fold from its current 400 
locations27. 
Barriers to Implementation
Coordination across numerous transit agencies with 
diverse coverage areas, passenger demographics, 
vehicle fleets and operations was the most 
significant barrier to the implementation Clipper 
Card, and this is likely to be the case for any 
open payment system as well. Fare coordination 
between agencies has been especially difficult. 
When riders transfer from one transit agency 
to another in a linked trip, the main point of 
negotiation was how and when to compensate 
27 Derek Toups, Personal Interview.
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agencies for the installation, maintenance and 
management of Clipper infrastructure. During 
the initial rollout of Clipper in the late-2000’s, 
MTC was responsible for funding these expenses 
(through State and federal grants); today they are 
largely the responsibility of the affected agencies 
once the fare infrastructure is operational28.      
Means of Accommodating Un(der)
banked Transit Riders
MTC is cognizant of the needs of its large 
contingent of un(der)banked riders and employs a 
large network of retail locations (400 outlets) where 
riders can reload their Clipper balances or buy new 
Clipper passes with cash payment. This is especially 
imperative for bus riders who lack access to the 
traditional fare vending machines found in heavy rail 
(BART) and light rail stations (Muni). MTC is currently 
investigating an open payment contract with 
Cubic in which Clipper fare cards would be sold as 
closed-loop stored value cards, a solution designed 
to dramatically increase the retail availability of 
Clipper fare media. These stored value cards would 
likely have less complicated terms of use and fee 
structures than prepaid debit cards. However, the 
Clipper system as a whole would be considered 
open payment in that any contactless card – a 
Clipper-branded stored value card, contactless 
bank card or prepaid debit card may be used to pay 
for transit. Recognizing the implementation issues 
Chicago faced, MTC expects that the transition from 
the current closed-loop Clipper to open payment 
would occur over a period of between one and three 
years, with both systems running in parallel during 
this time.
Seattle, Washington
Current Fare Collection Methods 
and Rationale to Change
King County Metro, the regional bus service 
operator of the Seattle metropolitan area, is the 
manager of the ORCA (“One Regional Card for 
All”) Card, a closed-loop contactless smartcard. 
ORCA began implementation in 2009 after a pilot 
program, Puget Pass. Legacy fare payment methods 
include cash payment and proof-of-payment paper 
tickets and are still accepted on all transit modes 
(buses, light rail, streetcar, commuter rail and 
ferries). Today passengers can purchase ORCA 
Cards at bus stations in Downtown Seattle, light rail 
28 Some smaller agencies that are still transitioning between 
legacy and Clipper fare payment systems may still receive MTC 
funding through the federal Congestion Mitigation and Air Qual-
ity program (CMAQ).
stations, online, at Metro Customer Service offices 
or through a small network of retail locations (mostly 
grocery stores). With ORCA implementation largely 
complete, having incorporated all transit modes 
and most regional transit agencies with a market 
penetration of over 60%29, King County Metro is now 
considering a transition from its closed-loop ORCA 
Card to an open payment system. However, no 
detailed plans on implementation for open payment 
were available. 
Barriers to Implementation
Regional inter-agency coordination was a 
major challenge of ORCA implementation. How 
to accommodate passengers’ linked trips from an 
ORCA-accepting agency to a non-ORCA agency 
was a point of dispute between the large pilot 
agencies (King County Metro and Sound Transit) 
and smaller suburban and rural transit operators. 
That is to say, how would the agency that has yet to 
install ORCA fare card readers to be compensated 
if a passenger paid for their original trip with ORCA? 
One transit agency serving rural Thurston County, 
Intercity Transit, suspended its ORCA payment in 
2012 because they. Eventually agencies agreed on a 
general policy that the ORCA transit agency would 
compensate 70-80% of the trip’s value if the second 
agency did not have ORCA fare readers. With nearly 
all regional transit agencies operating ORCA today, 
however, the issue of fare reciprocity has receded 
from agency discussion.  
Means of Accommodating Un(der)
banked Transit Riders
All cash payment options on ORCA fare 
machines at stations, as well as legacy fare payment 
media (proof-of-payment paper tickets) have been 
preserved. There is no identifiable conflict or inequity 
with respect to ORCA’s un(der)banked riders given 
that it is a closed-loop, proprietary system that 
continues to accept cash payments. However, King 
County Metro is unique among American transit 
agencies in its recent widespread adoption of equity-
driven social fares for low-income riders. In March 
of 2015, King County Metro began a reduced-fare 
program called “ORCA Lift,” where low-income 
riders can register with local health clinics or 
nonprofits to receive a discounted fare smartcard. 
This network of nonprofits and clinics was assembled 
from the rollout of the Affordable Care Act and is 
considered unique among transit agencies for its 
cross-industry partnership. Households earning up 
to 200 percent of the federal poverty level ($47,700 
for a family of four) may apply30. Applicants who 
29 Chuck Sawyer, Personal Interview.
30 Full conditions for ORCA Lift qualification are located here
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can verify their participation in any means-tested 
benefits program such as food stamps or Medicaid 
immediately qualify. King County Metro anticipates 
that ORCA Lift will eventually reach up to 100,000 
low-income riders, making it by far the nation’s most 
comprehensive low-income fare discount. ORCA Lift 
is expected to cost between $7 and $9 million per 
year in foregone revenue and administration costs 
(Johnson, 2015). Because ORCA is a regional, inter-
agency smartcard, ORCA Lift also allows low-income 
riders to use Sound Transit light rail, commuter rail, 




As a general limitation of this study, it cannot 
be overstated that few conclusive, statistically 
significant conclusions can be drawn from a 
survey with such a small sample size (n=51). 
This limitation stems from insufficient funds and 
time necessary to collect a truly representative 
sample, which would have required about 600 
respondents and $3,600 in funding for survey 
compensation incentives. However, in the 
interest of investigating an under-explored area 
of research for a vulnerable group where data 
collection is time-consuming and expensive, this 
study employed Pearson’s Chi Square Test to 
see if any statistically significant relationships 
could be established. The Pearson’s Chi Square 
Test was chosen as an analytical tool because 
both the dependent and independent variables 
explored in the survey questionnaire were 
categorical. The independent variable explored 
in the survey was banked or un(der)banked 
status. The dependent variables included: age; 
gender; trip purpose; trip frequency; trip length; 
number of transfers; mode choice; method of 
payment; fare discounts; Metro Card point of 
purchase; Metro Card type; household income; 
and smartphone ownership. The results of the 
Pearson’s Chi Square Test are given in Appendix 
3. 
As expected with a relatively small sample 
size, the Chi Square revealed few statistically 
significant relationships between independent 
and dependent variables. The only statistically 
significant relationships were between banked / 
un(der)banked status and two dependent variables: 
number of transfers and method of payment. The 
relationship between method of payment and 
un(der)banked status is expressed by the p-value 
of 0.008, which indicates a less than one percent 
likelihood that the correlation exists purely by 
chance. However, this relationship is not meaningful 
in that a rider’s method of payment is intrinsically 
linked to the types of financial services they use and 
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therefore to their un(der)banked or banked status. 
The relationship between number of transfers and 
un(der)banked status is more meaningful, however. 
With a p-value of 0.039, this relationship meets 
the significance threshold of 0.05 and indicates a 
less than four percent chance this travel behavior 
occurred at random. All other relationships tested 
failed to meet the significance threshold and must 
therefore be treated with caution. This is not to 
preclude the possibility of the relationship being 
significant, only that a larger sample size is needed 
to confirm it. For purposes of discussion, this study 
includes descriptive statistics to indicate possible 
relationships that may be confirmed with larger 
sample sizes. Preliminary conclusions concerning 
the results of this study’s original hypotheses are 
included below.
Hypothesis 1: Un(der)banked individuals 
are likely to have longer commutes 
and a larger average number of 
transfers than banked individuals. 
This hypothesis must be at least partially rejected 
given that a statistically significant correlation was 
found between banked individuals and larger 
numbers of transfers. Surprisingly, un(der)banked 
respondents tended to have a lower number of 
transfers than banked respondents. Sampling 
bias may have played a role in this result: because 
surveys were only completed on two weekdays 
and one Saturday, it is possible that weekend travel 
behavior was over-represented in the sample. 
Another possibility is that the sample is biased by the 
survey locations: both Fordham Road and Myrtle-
Wyckoff are relatively well served by public transit. 
Studies citing the long commutes of low-income 
New Yorkers typically cite the more peripheral areas 
of the city such as outer Queens (where bus and 
subway access are much more sparse) as being 
more emblematic of this trend (Center for an Urban 
Future, 2011, 13). Among respondents sampled, 
60% of those with commutes greater than sixty 
minutes were un(der)banked, as shown in  Table 
13. However, this does not represent meaningful 
deviation from the sample as a whole, which was 
63% un(der)banked. Therefore the hypothesis that 
un(der)banked individuals are more likely to take 
trips longer than sixty minutes must also be rejected. 
Hypothesis 2: Unbanked people are 
more likely to take multiple transit 
modes than the banked population. 
Due to the small sample size, no statistically 
significant relationship could be established 
between un(der)banked status and travel mode 
choice. Table 16 indicates a slight preference 
among un(der)banked respondents for subway 
travel. 71% of exclusive subway riders were un(der)
banked, compared to 63% of the sample as a whole. 
Meanwhile, 56% of multi-modal respondents were 
un(der)banked, indicating a slight preference against 
multi-modal travel among un(der)banked riders. 
Therefore, this hypothesis should be rejected. 
Hypothesis 3: Unbanked people are less likely 
to receive assistance in paying for Metro Card. 
Very few respondents (n=5) answered that 
they received a discounted Metro Card. No 
statistically significant relationship between 
this variable and un(der)banked status could be 
established. A much larger sample size will be 
needed to confirm or reject this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: Unbanked people are 
more likely to buy Weekly Unlimited 
Metro Cards than other types. 
Given the small sample size, no statistically 
significant relationship could be established 
between un(der)banked status and type of Metro 
Card purchased. Table 18 indicates that a very 
weak preference may exist toward Pay-As-You-
Go and Single Ride Metro Cards and against 
Weekly and Unlimited Metro Cards. However, 
due to the small sample size these conclusions 
must be confirmed with a much larger dataset. 
Hypothesis 5: Un(der)banked 
individuals are equally likely to own 
smartphones as banked individuals. 
A substantial majority of un(der)banked respondents 
did own smartphones (69%), compared to 84% 
of banked respondents. Likewise, there was no 
statistical relationship found between un(der)banked 
status and smartphone ownership in the Pearson’s 
Chi Square Test (p-value of 0.227). Therefore we 
may accept this hypothesis and can conclude 
that un(der)banked and banked respondents are 
equally likely to own smartphones, apart from 
the influence of other explanatory variables. 
Case Study Results
Travel behavior and transportation equity of the 
un(der)banked is an emerging topic of research 
with a relatively sparse academic literature to 
support it. Transit agencies themselves have 
devoted even less attention to the topic; the 
implementation of open-loop fare payment 
systems is what has prompted most research 
on the intersection of fare payment and access 
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to financial services. Given that just two major 
American transit agencies  have implemented 
open payment systems31, it is unsurprising that 
it is generally uncommon for transit agencies 
to perform their own assessments of un(der)
banked communities or survey their riders 
about their access to financial services. The 
only three agencies known to have done so are 
the Chicago Transit Authority (Nancy Whelan 
Consulting, 2013; Brakewood and Kocur, 2012), 
San Francisco Metropolitan Transportation 
Commision (Smartcard Alliance Transportation 
Council, 2008, 8), and the Southwest Ohio 
Regional Transit Authority (Brakewood and 
Kocur, 2012). Of these agencies, only the 
Chicago Transit Authority’s analysis is publicly 
available. This analysis stopped short of 
evaluating the impacts of non-transit prepaid 
card transactions among un(der)banked riders 
as part of its Fare System Equity Analysis. 
Transport for London served un(der)banked 
riders by continuing to operate a closed-loop 
Oyster Card in addition to an open payment 
system. In addition, the U.K.’s estimated two 
million un(der)banked individuals appear to 
enjoy more equitable access to financial services 
through national regulations on the consumer 
finance sector32. A national partnership between 
the U.K. Post Office and JPMorgan created 
Universal Bank Services Scheme in 2003, a low-
cost bank account serving 4.5 million mostly 
low-income people who are able to collect 
government benefits electronically (“Retail 
banking,” 2006). Therefore, there are relatively 
fewer un(der)banked individuals for London 
transit agencies to accommodate. Transport 
for London performed an equity analysis of 
transit riders paying cash for bus fare during 
its transition to a cashless bus fare payment 
system and found that cash-paying riders could 
be accommodated through the closed-loop 
smartcard Oyster which is supported by an 
extensive retail network (Transport for London, 
2011).    
In order to avoid inequitable outcomes from 
prepaid card implementation as well as potential 
Title VI litigation, agencies must significantly expand 
the scope of both their data collection and equity 
analysis efforts. Travel behavior surveys like the 
methodology employed in this study, which capture 
riders’ use of transit as well as access to financial 
services, should become the norm and employed 
at a statistically significant scale among any major 
transit agency considering implementing an open 
payment system. 
31 These agencies are Utah Transit Authority and Chicago Transit 
Authority.
32 Andrew Anderson, Personal Interview.
Open payment systems are becoming more 
prevalent across major American transit agencies. 
Washington, D.C.’s WMATA and Philadelphia’s 
SEPTA33 are both in the process of implementing 
open payment systems (Washington Metropolitan 
Area Transportation Authority, 2011), while King 
County Metro34 and the Bay Area’s Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission35 are considering 
it as the next step beyond their existing closed-
loop smartcards. The high upfront capital cost of 
implementation is generally the biggest barriers 
to implementation. Smaller transit agencies cannot 
generally afford open payment technology due to 
their generally lower ridership and smaller operating 
budgets. The primary rationale for transit agencies 
implementing open payment is two-fold: first, the 
long-term reduction in operating costs that would 
come with removal of cash-handling equipment 
and maintenance of a fare card supply chain; 
second, the opportunity to revenue-share with the 
private sector in non-transit transactions that are 
generated through agency-issued prepaid cards. 
Other motivations less frequently mentioned were 
reduced bus dwell times and improved passenger 
throughput at stations. Finally, and not insignificantly, 
is the benefit of providing an improved customer 
experience, which manifests in more seamless multi-
modal transfers, faster passenger boarding, higher 
ridership and higher farebox revenue. Open payment 
also enables agencies to eventually remove cash 
handling equipment on buses, a tremendous boon 
for bus travel time and performance. 
Transit-issued prepaid debit cards are not 
necessarily an inequitable solution for the un(der)
banked provided that they are used only for transit 
transactions. It is worth mentioning that in any 
open payment system, transit riders are in no way 
required to use their prepaid cards for non-transit 
purposes. Using Ventra, for instance, exclusively as a 
transit fare card would negate most of the fees that 
are levied against consumers. Not enough data is 
available from the Chicago system about consumer 
spending patterns on Ventra prepaid cards on transit 
vs. non-transit transactions. Non-transit spending is 
considered highly sensitive private information that 
is not readily available to researchers. Future internal 
research from credit card networks may be needed 
to clarify the balance between transit and non-transit 
spending on open-loop transit prepaid cards. 
It follows that, for un(der)banked communities, 
consumer education and outreach about prepaid 
cards will be critical in the acceptance of any 
open payment system. For some un(der)banked 
consumers, they may ultimately be a means of 
encouraging greater retail spending and even their 
33 Jerry Kane, Personal Interview.
34 Chuck Sawyer, Personal Interview.
35 Derek Toups, Personal Interview.
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introduction to the mainstream consumer finance 
sector, which presents ethical challenges to transit 
agencies: do the transit agencies issue prepaid cards 
and leave riders to figure out their terms, fees and 
limitations on their own, while sharing with the card 
networks in the lucrative interchange fees levied on 
non-transit transactions? Or do the transit agencies 
take a more proactive approach in educating their 
riders on what might be their first exposure to a 
mainstream financial product? So far, the Chicago 
Transit Authority has taken the former approach, 
though of course subsequent implementations 
at other agencies may have different outcomes. 
Due to the nature of public-private partnerships, 
however, it is generally not in the best interests of 
transit agencies to impose overly strict or onerous 
contractual terms on the private sector. Private 
sector companies responsible for operating and 
maintaining contactless smartcard technologies 
provide a valuable and coveted service that transit 
agencies risk losing if they find the contracts 
unfavorable. Because of this inherent conflict of 
interest, transit agencies may not be the ideal 
stakeholder to promote equity for un(der)banked 
riders in an open payment system beyond the bare 
minimum requirements of Title VI. Which New 
York City stakeholders should safeguard equity of 
contactless smartcard implementation is a matter 
warranting further discussion.
While currently prepaid cards represent a 
preferred alternative for agencies to accommodate 
un(der)banked riders under an open payment 
system, this may not be the case for much longer. 
Growing evidence suggests that prepaid debit 
cards may, in fact, be a stopgap measure for the 
un(der)banked in an open payment system until NFC 
and mobile payment infrastructure matures and 
becomes more ubiquitous. As Table 20 suggests, 
smartphones are more prevalent than bank accounts 
in low-income, un(der)banked communities. The 
emergence of Apple Pay, Google Wallet, and other 
app-based mobile payment systems for commuter 
rail systems is promising. Among American agencies, 
the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 
was a pioneer in enabling a mobile payment system 
on its commuter railroad network (Brakewood et 
al, 2014). Although the market penetration of this 
technology on MBTA commuter rail is not yet known, 
smartphones and consumer mobile payments among 
commuter rail passengers are highly prevalent. 76% 
of passengers surveyed owned a smartphone, while 
50% had made a mobile payment at other merchants 
(ibid, 15). Among fare policy experts, commuter rail is 
seen as the early adopter of mobile transit payments 
because – unlike a rapid transit system – conductors 
typically take tickets manually, and the need to move 
high volumes of passengers through fare gates 
quickly is less pressing36. The potential operations 
cost savings in reducing cash handling operations 
and streamlining payments are very appealing to 
transit agencies: Portland’s Tri-Met recently launched 
a mobile payment application across all of its 
modes37, while New York MTA’s Metro-North Railroad 
recently issued an RFP for mobile payment on the 
nation’s second largest commuter rail system (Anders 
et al, 2014, 12). SEPTA also expects mobile payment 
to eventually supplant its Key smartcard among 
overall transit fare payment transactions38. 
One shortcoming that mobile payment 
technology must overcome, however, is the speed 
necessary to complete a payment transaction. Gated, 
urban transit systems like New York City Transit 
require transaction processing speeds of around 
500 milliseconds to achieve desirable passenger 
throughput and avoid overcrowding at the turnstile 
gates . As of 2015, mobile payment technology 
has not yet achieved this transaction processing 
speed in the United States beyond a handful of pilot 
demonstrations. As soon as the NFC technology 
matures and achieves this speed, however, 
smartphone apps may become transit agencies’ 
preferred fare payment system. 
Although mobile payment technology using NFC 
in the United States typically requires access to a 
mainstream bank account (as in the cases of Apple 
Pay or Google Wallet), prepaid debit card companies 
are increasingly adopting mobile applications. 
Mobile payment technology linked to prepaid debit 
accounts is already widespread in countries of the 
developing world, where mainstream financial 
participation is much lower than in the United States. 
Mozido, a Texas-based mobile payment manager, 
recently announced a partnership with the City of 
Oakland’s municipal ID card, which also doubles 
as a GPR prepaid debit card. Although no mobile 
application has yet emerged that can be used by 
un(der)banked consumers, it is easy imagine a 
public-private partnership between prepaid debit 
card companies and transit agencies enabling 
un(der)banked riders to pay mobile transit fares using 
a prepaid card company’s mobile application. 
36 Josh Robin, Personal Interview.
37 Portland Tri-Met modes do not have fare gates to control 
entry to the system, instead relying on proof-of-payment (Anders 
et al, 2014, 12). Comparisons between Tri-Met and larger, urban 
transit agencies like the MTA are not equivalent in this regard.
38 Jerry Kane, Personal Interview.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Mitigating or resolving any potential inequitable 
outcomes of a transit open payment system 
in New York City will require addressing 
the intersecting issues of access to financial 
services and transportation equity among the 
un(der)banked, a highly vulnerable group. A 
truly equitable fare open-loop fare payment 
system would involve an inter-governmental 
partnership between transit agencies and city 
governments aimed at achieving three goals: 
ensuring a ubiquitous network of retail locations 
to purchase and reload transit prepaid cards, 
especially in low-income neighborhoods; 
providing an outreach campaign for un(der)
banked on how to maximize the benefits of open 
payment while avoiding the fees associated 
with prepaid cards; a comprehensive citywide 
consumer education program; and expanded 
regulatory capacity over the consumer finance 
sector to ensure un(der)banked communities 
have greater access to mainstream bank 
accounts and at more favorable terms.  
Based on the results of the surveys and expert 
interviews performed, this investigation concludes 
that this task is likely too large and inter-disciplinary 
in scope for any single transit agency to resolve 
alone. Although it may seem self-evident to transit 
riders, transit agencies’ general core competency 
is their ability to provide effective transit service for 
passengers, and not necessarily to provide social 
services such as reduced-fare programs or promote 
access to consumer financial products. While federal 
equity mandates such as Title VI require transit 
agencies to serve protected groups such as low-
income or unbanked passengers equitably, this does 
not necessarily suggest that the transit agencies 
themselves must be the stakeholders responsible 
for designing, funding and implementing equity 
programs. The results of this investigation’s surveys 
and interviews indicate that there is a strong need 
for inter-governmental partnerships between 
various stakeholders such as the MTA, NYMTC, and 
City, State and federal agencies. The MTA itself 
may, in fact, play a smaller supporting role in the 
implementation of equity measures supporting an 
open payment system. For instance, while the MTA 
may be responsible for implementing contactless 
fare payment infrastructure at its stations and assets, 
fare policy accommodations for the un(der)banked 
could be managed by City agencies, while federal 
legislative action may be required to promote 
equity for the un(der)banked in the mainstream 
financial and AFS sectors. Accordingly, a series of 
policy recommendations for each of the relevant 
stakeholders in the New York metropolitan area is 
proposed below: 
Role of New York City (and 
Other Municipalities)
Much of what is known about the un(der)banked 
in New York City comes from groundbreaking 
research of the Department of Consumer Affairs, 
and particularly its Office of Financial Empowerment. 
Their Citywide Financial Services Study contains the 
most accurate and precise data on un(der)banked 
communities available. The Department of Consumer 
Affairs (DCA) must expand these data collection 
efforts and ensure that un(der)banked estimates 
are prepared regularly, either annually or biennially. 
In recognition of the fact that inequality affects 
suburban areas as well as New York City, suburban 
jurisdictions such as counties or regional MPO’s 
should replicate DCA’s methodology and collect data 
on their own un(der)banked populations. Ultimately, 
New York municipalities must partner together on 
this data collection so that a regional, frequently 
updated portrait of residents’ access to financial 
services can be established. While this reinforces 
the importance of regional governance more 
broadly, and its relative absence in the New York 
metropolitan area, the un(der)banked issue deserves 
special priority because it represents growing 
socioeconomic inequalities that could ultimately 
derail local economic growth if not addressed. 
Collecting data to diagnose communities’ access 
to financial services is the vital first step needed to 
promote financial empowerment and equity.
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Since 2008, DCA has launched an extensive 
network of neighborhood Financial Empowerment 
Centers in 30 low-income communities across 
New York City to promote free financial counseling 
and low-cost financial services products. This is 
a commendable program that could be easily 
leveraged in preparation for a transit open payment 
system, where low-income transit riders could be 
proactively coached about upcoming changes to 
the Metro Card. This effort could include expanding 
access to transit-issued stored value cards or low-
fee GPR prepaid cards. DCA research shows that 
such outreach is vital, especially with respect to 
prepaid cards. Just 10% of recent immigrants in the 
NYC Department of Consumer Affairs’ Immigrant 
Financial Services Survey had used prepaid cards 
previously, compared to nearly 70% who had 
used money transfer services (NYC Department of 
Consumer Affairs, 2013, 22). The City should also 
provide additional subsidy to expand the network 
of community development credit unions that 
are known to provide more affordable, culturally 
appropriate financial services to lower-income 
communities. Based on Chicago Transit Authority’s 
implementation of open payment, it is clear that 
proactive consumer education about prepaid cards 
and other low-cost financial services is vital for an 
open payment to provide equity to the un(der)
banked. DCA is ideally situated to meet this need.
As part of this proactive consumer finance 
education campaign for un(der)banked riders, DCA 
should consider additional consumer protections 
aimed specifically at prepaid debit card products. 
These might entail emailing prepaid card customers 
and alerting them to check balances online or to 
use retail cash back instead of ATM withdrawals in 
order to avoid unnecessary fees. Los Angeles’ Ready 
Credit pilot program was notable in pioneering this 
approach (Keitel, 2012, 22). To avoid the double-
charging issue that Chicago transit riders faced 
with Ventra’s rollout, agencies should adopt a 
proactive advertising campaign on transit facilities. 
One example is Transport for London’s awareness 
campaign against “card clash,” in which riders were 
advised against carrying multiple contactless cards 
in the same purse or wallet to avoid having both 
cards be charged39. This campaign warns riders not 
to store multiple contactless cards in the same wallet 
when entering and exiting the system.   
As mobile transit ticketing technology matures, 
agencies considering an open payment fare 
collection system should drive a hard bargain with 
its private sector partners to ensure equitable policy 
outcomes for un(der)banked transit riders. However, 
transit agencies themselves have little to no authority 
over financial industry regulations governing the 
terms and fees of consumer financial products. This 
39 Candace Brakewood, Personal Interview
suggests that New York City must implement strong 
municipal regulations of the terms and conditions 
implemented with any prepaid debit card the MTA 
ultimately promotes. One Best Practice can be 
found in San Francisco’s CurrenC SF initiative. This 
municipal policy encourages businesses to adopt 
direct deposit for banked employees and payroll 
prepaid cards for the un(der)banked. Prepaid 
payroll cards under CurrenC SF must meet certain 
standards: no overdraft fees, no monthly or annual 
fees, at least one free bank withdrawal and one 
in-network ATM withdrawal each pay period, and 
one free phone call to customer service agent each 
month (Valenti and Heiss, 2013, 9). City agencies 
should also consider requiring prepaid card account 
terms of service to be printed in languages other 
than English, given the predominance of immigrant 
communities among the un(der)banked. Enacting 
similar initiatives at the City level would enable the 
MTA to avoid the inequitable outcome of passing 
burdensome prepaid card fees onto its most 
vulnerable riders.
Finally, City agencies such as DCA, the Human 
Resources Administration (HRA) and Department 
of Social Services (DSS) should investigate 
opportunities to promote equity for un(der)banked 
transit riders through a unique collaboration between 
mobile payment management companies, commuter 
benefit cards such as TransitChek and the recently 
launched municipal identification card, ID NYC. As 
shown through Figure 18, smartphones are often 
more prevalent in un(der)banked communities than 
bank accounts. This study’s surveys and interviews 
confirm that mobile phones are highly prevalent in 
nearly all communities, with a market penetration 
of between 75 and 90 percent. These data, and 
the ongoing work of mobile payment management 
companies like Masabi with transit agencies such 
as Boston’s MBTA Commuter rail and MTA’s Metro-
North Railroad, indicate that the transit market is 
ripe to adopt mobile payment in a proof-of-payment 
fare collection environment such as express bus or 
commuter rail modes. However, mobile payment 
is not an equitable fare payment solution because 
this technology requires a link to a passenger’s bank 
account; to accommodate un(der)banked riders, the 
cash payment fare infrastructure must be preserved. 
Furthermore, until mobile payment can achieve 
reasonable transaction processing speeds it will be 
of limited value to gated transit systems such as New 
York City Transit’s subways and buses. 
Meanwhile, the City’s Human Resources 
Administration has recently launched the municipal 
ID program, ID NYC. ID NYC offers another 
promising avenue to promote transportation equity 
for the un(der)banked. The card is accepted as 
sufficient identification to open a mainstream bank 
account, which may enable a significant portion 
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of un(der)banked individuals to become banked. 
These residents are likely recent immigrants who 
lack sufficient U.S. credit history to get a mainstream 
bank account but have sufficient income to maintain 
a minimum balance. As a promotion to encourage 
adoption of ID NYC, the card also provides free 
annual memberships to local museums, as well as 
discounts on grocery purchases, health and fitness 
centers, and prescription drug benefits. ID NYC 
should extend the program further by coupling 
enrollment with a low-fee, transparent prepaid 
card as the City of Oakland has done. Coupling 
ID NYC with a prepaid debit card would enable 
undocumented or un(der)banked New Yorkers to 
more easily access City services such as healthcare, 
financial counseling and transit. If the City negotiates 
strongly, the prepaid debit card that accompanies 
ID NYC could also be accessible by a mobile 
application. This crucial step would expand mobile 
payment options to the un(der)banked on express 
buses and commuter rail and would relive transit 
agencies of the responsibility to design, build, 
operate and maintain such an application. Finally, the 
City should negotiate with the prepaid card manager 
to ensure the cards are contactless, enabling them 
to used seamlessly in an open payment system and 
reloadable at the transit agency’s contracted retail 
network.
In the interest of providing additional 
transportation equity to un(der)banked riders, City 
agencies such as DCA or HRA should follow the 
example of Seattle’s King Count Metro in launching 
a reduced-fares program for low-income riders. 
Low-income and un(der)banked riders in New 
York City today face a triple-bind of rising transit 
fares40, stagnant wages and a ballooning cost of 
living. Reduced transportation costs will improve 
access to jobs and economic opportunity for these 
communities. As shown in Figure 16, un(der)banked 
riders are more likely to buy Weekly Pass and “Pay 
As You Go” Metro Cards than the Monthly Unlimited 
Cards, even though the Monthly Unlimited Pass 
has a lower cost per ride. This is likely because 
of the high upfront cost of the Monthly Unlimited 
Pass compared to other fare payment alternatives. 
Implementing a reduced-fare program would be 
relatively straightforward given the network of 
enrollment locations already present for ID NYC. In 
addition to the handful of ID NYC registration offices, 
City agencies could partner with CUNY community 
colleges, NYC public libraries, NYCHA public housing 
offices or DCA’s Financial Empowerment Centers. 
Un(der)banked riders would register for both cards 
in tandem; having shown evidence of New York 
City residence and participation in a means-tested 
welfare program (such as Temporary Aid to Needy 
40 With the MTA’s base fare increase expected in 2017, the 
agency will have raised transit fares five times in the past decade.
Families, Medicaid or “food stamps”), the riders 
would receive an annual, transit-issued contactless 
smartcard. The reduced-fare program could set 
transit fares at one-half of the general rate, as King 
County Metro has done, or provide a flexible sliding 
scale based on the applicant’s income.
One final opportunity for City agencies to 
become involved relates to the planned expansion of 
TransitChek41. TransitChek is an optional commuter 
benefits program in which transit benefits (up to 
$130 per month) are allocated in pre-tax dollars 
from employers to employees to encourage transit 
demand management. Benefits arrive in the form of 
a Visa prepaid debit card, which can be used for any 
transit or retail transaction. By 2016, all companies in 
New York City with more than 20 full-time employees 
will be required to offer TransitChek, due to the 
passage of the NYC Transit Ordinance. Both Seattle’s 
King Count Metro and Philadelphia’s SEPTA indicated 
that large, company-issued transit cards – such as 
those offered by universities or major corporations 
to students or employees - make up a significant 
portion of their ridership and are instrumental in the 
success of their contactless smartcard programs in 
providing a large pool of early adopters who become 
enrolled en masse. City agencies should negotiate 
with prepaid card companies like Visa to implement 
a contactless TransitChek benefits card to prepare 
for inter-operability with any future contactless 
smartcard fare payment system. 
Role of MTA
Following the lead of Transport for London, the 
MTA should transfer some of its decision-making 
authority over social fare policy to some of the 
City agencies above that are better prepared to 
implement equitable fare solutions in low-income 
and un(der)banked communities. Measures such 
as reduced-fares for low-income riders are best 
handled through City agency administrative 
networks, such as those of the ID NYC and Financial 
Empowerment Centers, are better equipped to 
manage. For a significant operating cost savings, 
the MTA could outsource its existing administrative 
units responsible for the discounts for elderly and 
disabled riders to the DCA or HRA. Rather than filling 
the role of social services provider with respect to 
un(der)banked riders, the MTA should specialize 
in the procurement, installation and management 
of contactless fare payment technology while 
outsourcing the implementation of equity policies 
for un(der)banked riders to other agencies where 
possible. In this scenario, the MTA would merely 
implement equity-based fare discounts that are 
planned and managed by other agencies, while 
41 Also known as “Wage Works”
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maintaining control of more traditional transit fare 
policies such as base fares, time of day-based pricing 
or distance or mode-based pricing. 
That being said, the MTA will play a pivotal 
role in the contract negotiations for a contactless 
smartcard technology and/or mobile payment 
vendor/operator. The MTA must drive a hard 
bargain with its contractor candidates and ensure 
that the terms of the fare payment system contract 
do not unduly inconvenience or deprecate un(der)
banked riders, especially those using open-loop 
prepaid cards for non-transit purchases. In the case 
of Chicago’s Ventra, it is clear that Chicago Transit 
Authority provided insufficient consumer protections 
for non-transit prepaid card transactions, evidenced 
by exorbitant fee structures and burdensome terms 
of use. If the MTA adopts open payment, the agency 
should perform extensive due diligence on the 
range of prepaid card products on the market and 
ensure that the prepaid cards meet established 
standards set by the Federal Reserve, FDIC and other 
regulatory bodies. However, it is likely that the MTA 
will need to partner with City and State agencies in 
the negotiations over the rollout of prepaid cards, 
since transit agencies have little to no authority to 
regulate the terms of consumer financial products. 
One area where the MTA has considerable 
leverage, however, is the creation of a ubiquitous, 
easily accessible retail network of reloading/
purchase stations where riders can continue to pay 
cash for Metro Card. The MTA already maintains 
such a network for the current Metro Card, but 
its operations must be enhanced and expanded. 
Proactive consumer-oriented advertising about 
nearby locations to pay cash for Metro Card is 
needed to raise rider awareness prior to any 
implementation of open payment. The creation 
of a mobile application displaying the locations of 
all retail locations selling MTA products is another 
means of achieving this objective. Finally, the MTA 
should partner with regional MPO’s such as NYMTC 
to gather additional data on financial services 
participation into standard annual customer travel 
surveys, especially within NYMTC’s Communities 
of Concern shown in Figure 4. Doing so will enable 
equity policies of other City agencies aimed at 
the un(der)banked to be reinforced with the most  
current data available. 
Role of Regional 
MPO’s and States
Regional MPO’s like NYMTC and State 
Departments of Transportation should encourage 
fare policy coordination between various agencies 
such as New York City Transit, Port Authority Trans-
Hudson (PATH), New Jersey Transit, Westchester 
County’s Bee-Line Bus, Long Island’s Nice Bus, 
and Metro-North/Long Island Rail Road. This 
recommendation is based on the experience of the 
San Francisco Bay Area’s Metropolitan Transportation 
Commission, which was instrumental in the planning 
and management of Clipper Card across more than 
twenty distinct regional transit agencies. Although 
New York City Transit and the Metro Card service 
a large share of regional transit trips, advance 
coordination between agencies will go a long way 
towards promoting seamless intermodal transfers 
and linked transit trips. If the experience of King 
County Metro is any guide, the greatest barrier 
to regional fare integration may be inter-agency 
conflicts over fare payment reciprocity. That is to 
say, agencies must agree on how to compensate 
one another when the smartcard-enabled agency’s 
riders transfer to a non-smartcard-enabled agency’s 
service. In the experience of SEPTA, the latter agency 
would simply send an invoice to the former; how 
much the latter agency is owed, and for which rider 
and trip types to allow equity-based fare discounts 
such as reduced-fares for low-income riders. To avoid 
confusion especially for inter-state and cross-Hudson 
travel, regional fare policy integration would require 
State-level actors such as the Port Authority and 
State Departments of Transportation to participate in 
negotiations. The ultimate objective is what Seattle’s 
ORCA and San Francisco’s Clipper have already 
achieved: many transit agencies and modes continue 
to exist (each with their own legacy fare payment 
systems), but they all share a single preferred 
regional smartcard fare payment system. 
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Role of the Federal 
Government
The primary role of the federal government 
in providing greater transportation equity for the 
un(der)banked will involve more regulation of 
prepaid cards’ fee structures, terms and conditions 
on a national scale. Federal agencies like the FDIC, 
Federal Reserve or the Department of Commerce 
may be relevant stakeholders in this process. 
A recent proposal by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), established by the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010, would limit consumer liability in 
the event prepaid cards are lost or stolen, ensure 
that access to account balances is free and adhere 
to credit card protections is a credit card is offered 
in connection with a prepaid account. Further 
measures from the CFPB could ensure that terms 
and conditions are printed in languages other than 
English, calls to customer service are free, and limit 
additional fees added to ATM cash withdrawals. 
Additional federal regulation could also pass 
legislation to limit the worst excesses of the AFS 
industry, such as exorbitant interest rates and late 
fees, as well as provide more access to low-cost 
banking services through public institutions such 
as the Post Office. However, these measures are 
likely beyond the scope of any City agency or transit 
operator’s concern in implementing contactless 
smartcard fare payment technology.  
 Transit agencies face a series of challenging 
decisions as new fare payment systems become 
increasingly sophisticated and complex. While the 
benefits of open payment systems are numerous 
and appealing, transit agencies must ensure that fare 
payment technology does not provide a differential 
or substantially inferior experience for its un(der)
banked riders, a highly transit-dependent group. 
The transit industry consensus among large, urban 
systems is increasingly coalescing around a hybrid 
open-loop smartcard product with dual functionality: 
a smartcard linked to a rider’s bank account, for 
the banked, or a GPR prepaid card for un(der)
banked. This consensus on technological methods 
is compelling but leaves a great deal of room for 
agencies to negotiate, interpret and extend solutions 
to promote transportation equity for their riders. 
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